The New Third Generation: Post-1965 Immigration and the Next Chapter in the Long Story of Assimilation

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Now is the time for social scientists to focus an analytical lens on the new third generation to see what their experiences reveal about post-1965 assimilation. This paper is a first step. We compare the household characteristics of post-1965, second-generation Latino and Asian children in 1980 to a "new third generation" in 2010. Today's new third generation is growing up in households headed by parents who have higher socioeconomic attainment; that are more likely to be headed by intermarried parents; that are less likely to contain extended family; and that, when living with intermarried parents, are *more* likely to have children identified with a Hispanic or Asian label compared to second-generation children growing in 1980. We use these findings to inform a larger research agenda for studying the new third generation.

For the better part of the last two decades, scholars have debated whether the post-1965 immigrant groups, which come mostly from Latin American, Asia, and the Caribbean, are following the assimilation path blazed by earlier waves of immigrants. Some maintain that today's immigrant groups are following multiple assimilation trajectories, with large numbers winding up permanently poor and negatively racialized (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 2005; Haller, Portes, and Lynch 2011). Others are more sanguine, noting the upward mobility from the first to second generation, resiliency, and economic outcomes hardly align with dire predictions of

some among the post-1965 second generation ending up in a "rainbow underclass" (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters 2011; National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine 2015).

Yet the disagreement over assimilation in the post-1965 immigration era is over something that is yet to happen. As historical assimilation of the Southern and Eastern European immigrant groups of the early part of the twentieth century showed, assimilation is a *multigenerational* process that continues to unfold beyond the second generation. But the debate rages on because scholars have had to study the post-1965 assimilation using only data on first and second generations — until now. It has been nearly a generation since the first statements on the assimilation of the "new second generation" of the post-1965 immigrants (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993) kicked off these debates. And now, US society is witnessing the rise of the grandchildren of the post-1965 immigrants — the "new third generation." With the tremendous ethnoracial and class diversity of the post-1965 immigrants, the new third generation will write the next and most significant chapter of contemporary assimilation.

Now is the time for social scientists to focus an analytical lens on the new third generation to see what their experiences reveal about post-1965 assimilation. We offer a first step in that direction through empirical analysis and a larger research agenda for studying this new third generation. Our empirical analysis draws on 1980 decennial US Census data to examine the household characteristics of the second generation. We compare those characteristics to data on third-generation children in the 2008–2013 ("2010" hereafter) Current Population Survey (CPS). We use these data in descriptive and multivariate analyses, focusing on changes in characteristics of the households in which the second generation grew up in 1980 compared to a third generation in 2010. We also examine differences in the way intermarried parents ethnoracially identify their children on survey forms between these two periods. We find that the new third generation of the post-1965 immigration era is, on virtually every measure, growing up in better household circumstances than the second generation 30 years earlier. The new third generation is growing up in households with parents who have higher socioeconomic attainments than the second-generation children did three decades earlier. They are also more likely to be living with intermarried parents, and they are less likely to be living in extended-family households. These findings indicate a path toward greater assimilation for the new third generation. But when it comes to trends in ethnoracial identification, the relevance of prevailing

assimilation theories is less clear. Third-generation children living in households with one non-Hispanic and one Hispanic parent in 2010 are more likely to be labeled as Hispanic on survey forms than their second-generation counterparts three decades earlier. Households with one Asian and one non-Asian parent in 2010 show similar patterns: third-generation children living with intermarried parents in 2010 more often have assigned to them an Asian label than second-generation children living with intermarried parents in 1980. These latter findings point assimilatory paths for the new third generation that may both converge and diverge from patterns observed among the European-origin third generation. While instructive, these findings and their implications come from our analytical glimpse into the lives of the new third generation. We thus lay out a research agenda for a new era of assimilation research that addresses the empirical and theoretical imperatives for fuller understanding of post-1965 immigrant groups.

IMMIGRATION THEN AND NOW; ASSIMILATION THEN AND NOW

The touchstone for studying the post-1965 immigrant assimilation is the large-scale immigration from Europe that took place mostly between 1880 and 1920 (Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Perlmann 2005). That historical immigration wave was the basis for the development of an assimilation theory that endured for much of the twentieth century (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921]). The first large-scale empirical study of assimilation that followed was Warner and Srole's (1945) study of "Yankee City," which included data on the intergenerational change of the city's immigrant groups. The second-generation children and some third-generation grandchildren of the European immigrants made it into the study, leading Warner and Srole to assert that assimilation proceeded in step fashion, with each generation passing along its advantages and disadvantages to the next, and shaping the pace of assimilation toward a common destination.

Subsequent studies of assimilation clarified the importance of generation-since-immigration in the assimilation process. Writing as the third-generation descendants of the European immigration were coming of age, Milton Gordon (1964) identified a series of interrelated stages of assimilation, of which "structural assimilation" — "large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society, on [a] primary group level" — and "identificational assimilation" — "[d]evelopment of a sense

of peoplehood based exclusively on [the] host society" — were paramount. The full solidification of assimilation theory happened two decades later, when scholars took a close look at the role that ethnoracial origin played in the lives of adult third- and fourth-generation descendants of the Southern and Eastern European immigration. Those studies overwhelmingly showed that ethnoracial origins had entered a "twilight" (Alba 1985), forming a symbolic and optional part of identity that scarcely had negative effects on life chances and opportunities (Gans 1979; Alba 1990; Waters 1990).

More recent scholarship has turned attention to historical immigrant populations that never made it into the canon of classic assimilation theory. Among the descendants of historical waves of Chinese and Japanese immigrants, there is overwhelming evidence of economic progress across generations (Alba and Nee 2003), even though some of these individuals are still regarded as "forever foreigners" (Tuan 1998). Third- and later-generation descendants of historical waves of Mexican immigrants display intergenerational progress, along a host of measures (Macias 2006; Duncan and Trejo 2007; Telles and Ortiz 2008; Lichter, Carmalt, and Qian 2011; Qian and Lichter 2011). Yet even with this intergenerational progress, Mexicans have not reached parity in their economic outcomes with US-born whites. The incompleteness of that assimilation is almost certainly due to historic discrimination. It may also be partly due to the way that the deleterious effect of unauthorized status on the socioeconomic attainments of earlier generations lingers on in subsequent generations (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015).

Just as the final stages of the Southern and Eastern European assimilation came into clearer focus, a new era of assimilation theorizing was beginning — this one for the post-1965 immigration. Named for the year in which liberalizing federal immigration reforms were passed,[1] the post-1965 immigrants came overwhelmingly from non-European origins: Latin America (largely Mexico), Asia, and the Caribbean. They also come from a spectrum of class origins, filling up the ranks of the poorest and least educated, as well as the wealthiest and most educated people in the United States (Portes and Rumbaut 2014). These two features — nonwhiteness and class diversity — of the post-1965 immigration have led some

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[1]The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, lifted national-origins quotas passed in 1924, created a preference system for immigrant admissions, and established equitable hemisphere and country visa limits.

scholars to revive and adjust the central tenets of assimilation theory to make sense of the experiences of the second generation. The resulting "segmented assimilation" perspective posits that today's immigrant groups assimilate into one of multiple ethnoracial and class-defined segments of US society (Portes and Zhou 1993). The class origins of the immigrants, their social and legal reception in the receiving society, and the cohesiveness of the co-ethnic community together determine segments of society to which groups assimilate (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Particularly at risk of assimilating on a "downward" path into the most precarious ethnoracial and class segments are second-generation Mexicans, some of the Caribbean-origin second generation, and some Southeast Asian groups. Their high poverty rates, negative legal and social reception, and co-ethnoracial communities lacking in social capital make their assimilation especially precarious, according to the perspective (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

These claims have their detractors. Among them are scholars who see the post-1965 second generation as having more in common with the second-generation children of Southern and Eastern European immigrants, in terms of their social and economic trajectories, than the segmented assimilation perspective would suggest (Alba and Nee 2003; Perlmann 2005). Others note that the direst assessments of the second generation do not bear out in empirical analyses (Waters et al. 2010). Some even argue that the second generation individuals have an advantage. Institutional arrangements with roots in the Civil Rights Movement positively recognize ethnoracial difference, offering a leg up to the nonwhite second generation (Waters 2010). And the second generation may possess a degree of cultural and social flexibility that pays off in multiple dimensions of life (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters 2011).

Still others argue that the assimilation/nonassimilation dichotomy that characterized research on the second generation from the past two decades paints on overly simplistic portrayal of the assimilation process. In studying the Mexican-origin population in Los Angeles, Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier (2015) argue that the poor socioeconomic origins, and, importantly, the unauthorized status of some immigrants, delay integration across generations such that it may take more than three generations for full integration to occur. Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier (2015) also argue that the various social, political, and economic dimensions of assimilation do not necessarily operate in lockstep. With the increased institutional recognition of myriad individual identities, ethnoracial identity may

not necessarily decline across generations, even as socioeconomic advancement attains.

These insights about the assimilation of the post-1965 immigrants from a vast body of research are more like detailed assimilation road markers than definitive destinations. Debates about the assimilation of the post-1965 assimilation rely almost exclusively on studies of the first and second generation. Assimilation is a multigenerational process, a principle that has receded too far into the backdrop of debates about the fate of post-1965 immigration wave. Although comparisons between today's immigrants and the last great wave that came from Europe are debatable (Foner 2005; Fox and Guglielmo 2012), a central insight gleaned from the study of those earlier immigrants is relevant to the post-1965 immigrants: it may take well more than two generations for the full extent of assimilation to unfold. Competing views of post-1965 assimilation — from the dourer and the more sanguine — cannot offer a complete picture of post-1965 assimilation because only two immigrant generations have come of age during the past half-century. Much as Perlmann and Waldinger (1997) noted nearly two decades ago, we argue that the full extent and character of post-1965 immigration assimilation will emerge with time, as the third and even fourth generation come of age. While Perlmann and Waldinger had to rely on prediction, we now have the data to begin assessing the nature of the post-1965 assimilation over three generations. Now is the time for social science research to turn its attention to the new third generation with the same vigor that has been behind studies of the second-generation.

STUDYING THE NEW THIRD GENERATION

We embark on that endeavor by examining several important outcomes measured at the household level. We cannot distinguish the new third generation of the post-1965 immigration wave from the fourth and later generation from earlier immigration waves unless the new third generation are children who coreside with parents. Therefore, second- and third-generation children living with parents serve as the unit of analysis, and we observe the characteristics of household in which they live: socioeconomic attainment of parents; having intermarried parents; living with extended family; and ethnoracial identification assigned by parents.

Socioeconomic attainment sits at the center of assimilation theories. Classical assimilation theory posits that each successive immigrant

generation will improve its socioeconomic attainment, indicated by more education and greater income. The segmented assimilation perspective, on the other hand, might predict socioeconomic stagnation or even decline into the third generation for Latinos, and a racialized form of identity in response entrenched racism. Asians with elevated socioeconomic origins, according to segmented assimilation, would find a place in the middle class, while perhaps maintaining a connection to ethnoracial identity that resembles that of the immigrant generation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

Another indicator of assimilation is whether the household context influences ties to the immigrant ethnoracial community through the presence of grandparents or other relatives in the household. The presence of extended family can be a strategy to cope with economic hardship or a way to get ahead by pooling resources. But the presence of extended family can also help maintain connections to ethnoracial culture because it may increase the need to speak a language other than English at home as well as observe other cultural or social ties to the ethnoracial community (Zhou and Xiong 2005).[2] Straight-line assimilation theory would predict a decline across generations in the presence of extended family members in the household. Segmented assimilation, which views sustained attachment to a co-ethnic community as a benefit to socioeconomic attainment, might predict a sustained presence of extended family among upwardly mobile groups, while a decline in the presence of extended family among groups experiencing downward assimilation.

Another key dimension of assimilation is intermarriage. Gordon (1964) included marital assimilation as one of the final stages of the assimilation process. According to classic assimilation theory, intermarriage should increase with each generation. The segmented assimilation perspective does not offer a clear predication on intermarriage. But the major tenets of the perspective suggest that groups experiencing downward mobility will have very low levels of intermarriage because of their social isolation; groups experiencing upward mobility might see an acceleration of intermarriage after the second generation. Studies of intermarriage rates in the post-1965 era offer a glimpse of these patterns, showing higher

[2]In supplementary analyses not reported here, we find only small differences in unemployment rates of the head of household (one percentage point in 1980; two percentage points in 2010), and small differences in the proportion of household below the poverty line (two percentage points in 1980; one percentage point in 2010) with extended family members and those without. These analyses are available upon request.

rates of out-marriage for the US-born than those for immigrants among Hispanics and Asians (Qian and Lichter 2007). This rise was particularly among third-plus-generation Hispanics whose immigrant ancestors were from a previous immigration wave; intermarriage among the second generation grew more slowly during the 1990s because the rapid growth of Asian and Hispanic immigrant populations provided greater opportunity for the second generation to find marriage partners of the same ethnoracial origin (Qian and Lichter 2011).

Intermarriage is relevant for the kinds of identity that the children of intermarried couples take on (Lieberson and Waters 1988; Telles and Sue 2009).[3] Ethnoracial boundaries can reconfigure depending on how the children of intermarriage think of themselves in ethnoracial terms (Lee and Bean 2010). Of course, just as intermarriage is intimately linked to other assimilation processes, so too might differences in ethnoracial identification among the children of intermarriages be linked to differences in socioeconomic attainment (Duncan and Trejo 2011; Emeka and Vallejo 2011). Classic assimilation would predict a weakening of ties to the ethnoracial identification of the immigration generation into the third generation. Segmented assimilation would predict that Latinos maintain a strong attachment to a Latino ethnoracial identification in response to persistent discrimination. Asians may also maintain some attachment because, according to segmented assimilation, attachment to the ethnoracial identification of the immigrant generation is tied to positive socioeconomic outcomes.

Analytical Approach

Due to data limitations, countless studies have attempted to measure assimilation across generations using cross-sectional data, often only making the distinction between immigrants and the US-born of a particular ethnoracial group (LaLonde and Topel 1992; Kao and Tienda 1995; Garcia 2011). The cross-sectional approach approximates rates for each immigrant generation at the same point in time, but it does not effectively capture true intergenerational change. The cross-sectional approach may also underestimate intergenerational assimilation, compared to an

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[3]Cohabitation, which has been on the rise in the last two decades, is also an important indicator of the durability of ethnoracial boundaries. Still, the legal, contractual nature of marriage makes it a more compelling indicator of those boundaries.

immigrant-generation-cohort approach (Parrado and Morgan 2008; Park and Myers 2010), which more accurately captures difference between cohorts of parents and children by also accounting for age. Furthermore, a cross section of immigrant generations at a single point in time would most likely include a third generation from a previous wave of immigration. To determine whether straight-line assimilation captures the experience of the post-1965 immigration era, we utilize the immigrant-generation-cohort method (Park and Myers 2010), which simultaneously measures the intergenerational mobility between immigrant generations at comparable ages, relative to a reference group in the same time period. The immigrant-generation-cohort method effectively makes, in this case, comparisons between a young third generation and a young second generation 30 years earlier (Park and Myers 2010).

Data limitations pose a challenge to studying the new third generation in terms of parents' socioeconomic attainment, the presence of extended family, intermarriage, and ethnoracial identification of children. Perhaps the most significant challenge is that a unique third generation is not readily identifiable in most publicly available survey data. The most prevalent way of identifying the third generation in large surveys, such as CPS, is to use questions about respondents' place of birth in combination with their parents' place of birth to identify a "third-plus generation," which includes individuals who were born in the United States to US-born parents. However, this third-plus generation encompasses individuals whose grandparents are foreign-born as well as individuals whose ancestral roots in the United States extend back more than three generations. It is thus virtually impossible to identify a "pure" *adult* third generation of individuals whose grandparents were first-generation immigrants.[4]

The CPS, a government survey administered jointly by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and the US Census Bureau, began asking about parents' place of birth in 1994. But it is still impossible to identify the pure *adult* third generation from these data. It is, however, possible to identify third-generation children residing in households headed by at least one-second-generation parent through the use of the parental nativity question asked of both the children and parents in the household. We use this approach in our analysis. Due to the small sample size of the CPS, especially in its ability to capture adequate numbers of a unique third

[4]This task is made even more difficult by the fact that the US Decennial Census stopped asking about parental nativity after the 1970 decennial census.

generation, we pool six years of data from 2008 to 2013, which we refer to as "2010" in the analysis.[5] Our new third-generation sample includes all US-born children who are co-residing with their second-generation parents.[6] We include parents between the ages of 25 and 54 because these are the prime working ages and also the ages at which parents are most likely to have children living in the household.

To determine generational differences from the second to the third generation, we compare the family and household context of third-generation children in 2010 to those of second-generation children in 1980. Drawing on 1980 decennial Census data, our second-generation sample includes all US-born children who are coresiding with their immigrant parents. Our analysis thus captures the household circumstances in which the new third generation is coming of age today compared to the household circumstances in which a second generation came of age 30 years earlier. It is important to consider what these data capture more precisely. Our approach does not allow for the direct observation of kinship and thus does not directly measure change from parents to their children (Duncan 1966). Still, our methodological approach of observing successive immigrant generations across time samples from each generation cohort broadly captures intergenerational change (Smith 2003, 2006a; Park and Myers 2010). While a strength of the Census and CPS, respectively, is that they allow us to identify households in which a unique second and third generation reside, these data sources do not provide detailed information on the circumstances of the individual children in these households. Indeed, the data on household characteristics that we analyze significantly reflect the behaviors (education, income, intermarriage, ethnoracial identity) of the parents of our second- and third-generation populations of interest. But the characteristics of household in which children reside are highly predictive of adult outcomes (Chetty et al. 2014a), and so the behavior of these parents, as

reflected in the indicators we use, is also telling of the future trajectory of these children as they enter adulthood.

We use the immigrant-generation-cohort method developed by Park and Myers (2010) to compare the kinds of households in which the new third generation is reared to those of their parents' cohort a generation earlier. To place the multivariate findings for immigrant generations in context, we compare Hispanic and non-Hispanic Asian ("Asian" hereafter) immigrant generations to third-plus-generation non-Hispanic whites (or "white" in the rest of the paper) as the reference group. This reference group acts as a proxy for the societal standard of the historical time period. As the sample of this reference group is much larger than the sample selected for immigrant generations, we randomly selected 5 percent of the 1980 sample and 20 percent of the 2010 sample for statistical analyses. Our unit of analysis is children in these specified households. It is important to note that our analysis does not attempt to capture the characteristics of all immigrant adults in 1980, or second-generation adults in 2010. Instead, our data capture households in which there are immigrant parents of the second generation in 1980, and second-generation parents of the third generation in 2010. Our analytical focus is on the second- and third-generation children and the characteristics of the households in which are growing up.

Beyond socioeconomic indicators of assimilation, which are well documented with this methodology (Park and Myers 2010; Park, Myers, and Jiménez 2014; Park, Nawyn, and Benetsky 2015), the coresidence of the young third generation with their second-generation parents provides an ideal opportunity to examine marriage and household structure as forms of assimilation of Hispanics and Asians. Therefore, we look at the presence of extended family members coresiding with third-generation children in 2010 and compare them to the shares for the second-generation children a generation earlier (in 1980). We also examine the share of third-generation children coresiding with intermarried parents. Finally, we examine the ethnoracial labels that parents assign to children in these households. In contrast to what the Census sets forth, we treat Hispanics, regardless of their ethnoracial sub-identification, as a single "race" group such that anyone who answers affirmatively to the Hispanic question is assigned to a Hispanic category, regardless of the race category selected from the separate race question. Likewise, we treat anyone who identified with any of the race categories conventionally subsumed under the pan-Asian category as broadly "Asian."

For our three outcomes, we use the following logistic regression model:

$$(O) = Year + Generation + Year \times Generation + Age$$
$$+ Mother's\ Education + Region$$

Our independent variables of interest are temporal. *Year* is the observation period (1980 is the reference year and 2010 = 1) which captures the period effects. *Generation* represents the generation-since-immigration status and the referent non-Hispanic whites in both 1980 and 2010 (non-Hispanic whites are the reference group and the parents of the second generation in 1980 and the parents of the third generation in 2010 = 1). The interaction term, *Year × Generation*, is the net effect change for these generations beyond the change observed for the white reference group. *Age* is included to control for any age distribution effects on the outcome. *Mother's education* is a proxy for socioeconomic status. *Region* is a control for any geographic differences.

We first explore the presence of immigrant grandparents or other extended family members in these households. We compare third-generation children in 2010 to second-generation children in 1980, modeling the determinants of living with extended family. We include both one- and two-parent households for these analyses and determine whether either is more likely to live with extended family. We then examine how socioeconomic status (proxied by mother's education or the education of the head of household when one-parent households are included in the sample) is associated with each of the three outcomes. Given that there may be significant differences for these outcomes across the United States, we include Census regions.

A second set of analyses examines the determinants of living with intermarried parents. Intermarriage is defined here as marriage between individuals who do not identify themselves of the same race — in the case of Hispanics, any marriage between someone identifying with any Hispanic category and someone identifying with no Hispanic category is an intermarriage; in the case of Asians, any marriage between someone identifying with any Asian category and someone who identifies with no Asian category at all is an intermarriage. We do not count as intermarriages unions among different subcategories of Asians and Hispanics (e.g., between Puerto Ricans and Mexicans; between Japanese and Chinese). Therefore, our estimate of intermarriage should be regarded as

conservative relative to the scale of intermarriage had we counted any cross-category marital union as intermarriage.

The final set of analyses explores the ethnoracial labels assigned to children when their parents come from different ethnoracial ancestries — when one parent is Hispanic and the other parent is not Hispanic; when one parent is Asian and one parent is not Asian. We examine these ethnoracial labels for second-generation children in 1980 and third-generation children in 2010. We model the odds of third-generation children receiving a Hispanic or Asian label in 2010 relative to 1980. We also look at the household-level factors predicting those labels. It is important to note that the 2010 CPS offered more choice in selecting ethnoracial labels than the 1980 census. Beginning in 2000, the census and the CPS permitted respondents to check multiple racial categories. Thus, intermarried parents in 1980 were forced to select a single racial category for their child, but parents 2010 could select multiple racial categories. The difference between the categories available in the 1980 census and the ability to select multiple racial categories in government surveys after 2000 — including in the CPS — is not relevant for households with a Hispanic parent because the census and CPS treat Hispanicity and race as distinctive, where parents select whether their children are Hispanic and their child's race in response to separate questions. The difference in available racial categories is relevant to households with Asian parents because the census and CPS treat the Asian subcategories as distinctive racial categories, allowing parents to select an Asian category *in combination* with other racial categories (e.g., Chinese and white; Japanese and black). The difference in the availability of categories for these households meant that we had to make decisions about how to regard children living in Asian intermarried households who were assigned an Asian category in combination with other racial categories. Following assimilation theories, we were interested in the degree to which there is some maintenance of an identification with the Hispanic or Asian category over time and across generations. Our analysis thus treats children who were identified as Asian in combination with another racial category in 2010 the same as children who were given an Asian label exclusively. Because parents who select Asian in combination with other categories for their children are not disregarding an Asian ancestry, we count these children as among those who appear to maintain an identification with Asian ancestry.

TABLE 1

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE SECOND GENERATION IN 1980 AND FOR THE THIRD GENERATION IN 2010 (INCLUDES BOTH ONE- AND TWO-PARENT HOUSEHOLDS) BOTH ONE- AND TWO-PARENT HOUSEHOLDS

	Hispanic households		Asian, non-Hispanic households		White, non-Hispanic households	
	2nd Generation (1980)	3rd Generation (2010)	2nd Generation (1980)	3rd Generation (2010)	3rd Generation (1980)	4th+ Generation (2010)
Two-parent household (%)	75	73	93	88	88	80
Age (mean)	7	7	6	7	9	8
Under age 10 (%)	65	65	76	69	54	56
Head of household age (mean)	37	36	37	39	37	39
Family size (mean)	5.2	4.5	4.7	4.4	4.6	4.3
Number of children (mean)	3.2	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.5
Extended family (%)	16.3	9.9	20.6	11.0	4.3	4.1
Household head with BA+ (%)	6.4	20.2	49.5	55	22.8	39.5
Unemployed head of household (%)	7.2	7.4	2.3	4.6	3.9	5.9
Working adults per household (mean)	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.5
Household income (median, 2010 dollars, thousands)	$40	$49	$75	$94	$66	$77
Poverty status (% below poverty line)	32.1	21.9	8.0	7.2	9.5	10.4
Observations (unweighted)	66,124	6,645	18,425	1,754	1,843,364	82,871

Source: Authors' calculations of March Current Population Survey (2008–2013) and 1980 decennial Census. Figures by generation status include one- and two-parent households with children aged 16 and under. Figures are limited to households where head of household is between 25 and 54 years old.

Overview of the New Third Generation

Table 1 includes the household characteristics of second-generation children in 1980 and third-generation children in 2010 compared to the white reference group in each time period. Households include both one- and two-parent households. The vast majority of the Asian and Latino new third generation under age 19 are young children: two-thirds are under the age of 10. And because data limitations make it impossible to identify post-1965 third-generation adults separate from individuals who are more than three generations removed from the immigrant generation,

we observe the family and socioeconomic characteristics of the households in which they grow up.

When comparing the household characteristics of Hispanics and Asians to non-Hispanic whites of a later generation, household structure differs across the groups, and some measures change over time. The mean age of heads of household is in the late thirties. Family size decreases and converges over time for both Asian and Hispanic groups (to 4.4 and 4.5 in 2010, respectively). Both groups have approximately two children per household, and, notably, there is a decrease (from 3.2 to 2.6 children) among Hispanics from the second to the third generation. The average number of children for Asians and whites changes little, and the three groups converge to an average of between 2.3 and 2.5 children per household by 2010.

The share of married-couple households declined across all groups, although whites experienced the greatest drop. It is important to note here that we applied age (for children and parents) and generation-status filters that resulted in an analytical sample with lower rates of single-parent-headed households than exists in a full sample that does not have these filters. However, the downward trend of two-parent households in our sample conforms to a more pronounced trend in a sample without selection filters.[7] Extended-family households are more common among Hispanics and Asians than among whites. Very few white households live with extended family members (4.1% in 2010), while Hispanics and Asians are much more likely to do so. For example, 11 percent of Asian households with third-generation children live with extended family members (compared to 9.9% for Hispanic households with third-generation children). These shares of extended-family households decreased from 20.6 percent among Asian households with second-generation children in 1980 (higher than the 16.3% for Hispanic households with second-generation children).

Hispanics and Asians share some similar household characteristics (e.g., family size, number of children, extended-family households) to whites. However, immigration policy and historical relationships between

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[7]We recognize that the share of married-couple households is higher for our sample than what is conventionally reported for race groups in the United States (The Annie E. Casey Foundation's Kids Count data; see http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data#USA/1/2/3,6,5,4/char/0). This is mainly due to the age and generation-status filters we use to restrict our sample. Our full sample without these restrictions results in married-couple household rates that are more consistent with others who report this.

sending countries and the United States has produced a socioeconomic profile for Hispanic immigrant generations that differs substantially from that of Asian immigrant generations in the post-1965 immigration era. Table 1 also includes levels of parental education across time and generations. Hispanic parents of the second generation in 1980 had low educational attainment, but there was substantial intergenerational mobility by 2010. Almost half of Asian householders had at least a college degree in 1980. Asian immigrant generations also experienced intergenerational mobility, as did white householders in the same time period. The differences in human capital across these groups help to explain the differences in labor force and economic characteristics of these households, including similarly low yet persisting poverty rates for both whites and Asians.

Living with Extended Family

While the descriptive statistics in Table 1 are suggestive, we offer multivariate analyses to more precisely capture differences across time and generation. We begin with the predictors of living with extended family. Table 2 includes the odds ratios of living in extended-family households for Hispanic children relative to white children.

As shown in Table 1, very few whites live in extended-family households, and the odds of children living in such households has decreased nominally over time (0.9 times the odds of 1980 in 2010). Relative to children in white households, children in Hispanic households have 4.27 times the odds of living with extended family members. All third-generation children in 2010 have 0.59 times the odds of living with extended family relative to second-generation children in 1980. The association between socioeconomic status and living with extended family members is mixed with differences for educational attainment and economic status. Model 4 shows that having a householder with a bachelor's degree reduces the odds of living with extended family by 43 percent. On the other hand, those who live in households below poverty are 80 percent less likely to live with extended family (but the effect of poverty status is only significant after accounting for mother's education, as Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 show). Therefore, it is not necessarily those who have the highest educational or low economic status who are living with extended family. Rather, it may be those who do not have high educational attainment, but do have some economic stability, who coreside with extended family members. Lastly, there is a statistically significant difference between those

TABLE 2
Odds Ratios of Living in an Extended-Family Household Children with at Least One Hispanic Parent

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Year (1 = 2010)	0.959	0.960	1.078	1.068	0.892	0.891	1.006	0.993
Generation (1 = Hispanic 3rd generation in 2010; Hispanic 2nd generation in 1980)	4.270***	4.346***	4.044***	3.703***	4.901***	4.963***	4.571***	4.180***
Year × generation	0.591***	0.586***	0.562***	0.562***	0.487***	0.484***	0.469***	0.471***
Age	1.012	1.012	1.007	1.008	1.017*	1.017*	1.013	1.013
Poverty status (1 = below poverty line)		0.924	0.795*	0.802*		0.914	0.798	0.800
Householder education (1 = bachelor's degree)			0.438***	0.437***			0.474***	0.474***
One-parent household					2.268***	2.746***	2.466***	2.439***
One-parent household × generation					1.074	1.079	1.024	1.047
One-parent household × year					0.465***	0.548***	0.585***	0.601***
One-parent household × year × generation					2.205***	1.953***	1.932***	1.862***
One-parent household × age					0.970*	0.966*	0.970*	0.970*
One-parent household × poverty status						0.630*	0.663	0.669
One-parent household × householder education							1.011	1.010
Region (ref: Northeast)								
Midwest				0.733**				0.739*
South				1.009				1.029
West				1.140				1.149
Constant	0.042***	0.042***	0.051***	0.054***	0.037***	0.037***	0.044***	0.046***
Observations	181,511	181,511	181,511	181,511	181,511	181,511	181,511	181,511
Log likelihood	−7.210e+06	−7.210e+06	−7.119e+06	−7.102e+06	−7.133e+06	−7.113e+06	−7.042e+06	−7.025e+06

Source: Authors' calculations of March Current Population Survey (2008–2013) and 1980 decennial Census. Notes: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

living in the Midwest and those to the Northeast (the Midwest has 0.73 times the odds of the Northeast).

Models 5 through 8 examine how one-parent households may differ in terms of their propensity to live with extended family members. One-parent families have more than twice the odds of living with extended family relative to two-parent families. This is less the case for Hispanic households in 1980, but dramatically increased by 2010. Socioeconomic status (household poverty, parent education) in one-parent households does not function in significantly different ways than it does for two-parent households. It is striking to note that regardless of socioeconomic status and parental structure, those in Hispanic families are consistently more than four times as likely to live in extended-family households than white families.

Table 3 presents the same outcome for children living in Asian households. Children in these households have greater odds of living in multigenerational or extended-family households than other ethnoracial groups.

Model 1 confirms that all children in Asian households have 5.56 times greater odds of living with extended family than whites. Third-generation children are half as likely to live with extended family as second-generation children in 1980. Consistent with findings for Hispanic households, children in Asian households with householders who have a bachelor's degree have odds of living with extended family that are 0.38 those of children living with less educated householders (Model 4). The association between poverty status and the likelihood of living with extended family is not statistically significant across models for Asians, although the odds ratios are consistent with results for Hispanics. Unlike the findings for Hispanic households, the introduction of socioeconomic status increases the odds of Asian families living in extended-family households to over seven times. The higher educational attainment of Asian households suppresses the degree to which Asian families live in extended-family households. Once controlling for educational attainment, the odds of living in extended-family households increases from 5.56 to 7.02. As observed among Hispanics, living outside the Northeast and in the Midwest yields just 0.70 times the odds of living with extended family among Asians compared to living the in the Northeast. Also consistent with outcomes for Latinos, children in Asian one-parent households are more likely to live with extended

TABLE 3
ODDS RATIOS OF LIVING IN AN EXTENDED-FAMILY HOUSEHOLD CHILDREN WITH AT LEAST ONE ASIAN PARENT

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Year (1 = 2010)	0.954	0.952	1.084	1.068	0.885	0.887	1.024	1.002
Generation (Asians) (1 = Asian 3rd generation in 2010; Asian 2nd generation in 1980)	5.562***	5.581***	7.024***	6.300***	6.026***	6.029***	7.576***	6.793***
Year × generation	0.500***	0.501***	0.456***	0.455***	0.466***	0.466***	0.424***	0.424***
Age	0.996	0.996	0.988	0.988	0.994	0.994	0.985	0.985
Poverty status (1 = below poverty line)		1.176	0.899	0.912		1.098	0.844	0.853
Householder education (1 = bachelor's degree)			0.381***	0.383***			0.395***	0.399***
One-parent household					1.943***	2.261***	1.878**	1.846**
One-parent household × year					1.077	1.076	1.001	1.033
One-parent household × generation					0.562***	0.561***	0.501***	0.490***
One-parent household × year × generation					2.352*	2.255*	2.319*	2.306*
One-parent household × age					0.988	0.984	0.995	0.995
One-parent household × poverty status						0.649	0.745	0.745
One-parent household × householder education							1.174	1.144
Region (ref: Northeast)								
Midwest				0.703**				0.706*
South				1.081				1.086
West				1.231				1.242
Constant	0.048***	0.047***	0.061***	0.062***	0.045***	0.044***	0.057***	0.059***
Observations	128,921	128,921	128,921	128,921	128,921	128,921	128,921	128,921
Log likelihood	−4.677e+06	−4.676e+06	−4.574e+06	−4.552e+06	−4.631e+06	−4.627e+06	−4.541e+06	−4.519e+06

Source: Authors' calculations of March Current Population Survey (2008–2013) and 1980 decennial Census. Notes: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

TABLE 4
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE SECOND GENERATION IN 1980 AND FOR THE THIRD GENERATION
IN 2010 INCLUDE ONLY TWO-PARENT HOUSEHOLDS

	Hispanic households		Asian, non-Hispanic households		White, non-Hispanic households	
	2nd Generation (1980)	3rd Generation (2010)	2nd Generation (1980)	3rd Generation (2010)	3rd Generation (1980)	4th+ Generation (2010)
Parents are intermarried (%)	7.5	28.5	20.0	62.0	3.1	9.3
Age (mean)	7	7	6	7	8	8
Under age 10 (%)	69	67	78	70	55	58
Head of household age (mean)	37	36	38	39	37	39
Family size (mean)	5.5	4.8	4.7	4.5	4.7	4.6
Number of children (mean)	3.2	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.7	2.5
Extended family (%)	16.9	8.1	20.6	9.6	4.0	3.5
Fathers with BA+ (%)	7.7	21.8	51.4	56.3	24.7	42.3
Mothers with BA+ (%)	4.6	24.8	40.7	57.7	14.0	44.8
Unemployed head of household (%)	6.3	6.3	2.1	4.1	3.5	4.7
Working adults per household (mean)	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.6
Household income (median, 2010 dollars, thousands)	$48	$58	$78	$100	$70	$87
Poverty status (% below poverty line)	20.8	13.9	6.0	5.4	6.2	5.0
Observations (unweighted)	49,404	4,890	17,130	1,532	1,616,394	66,707

Source: Authors' calculations of March Current Population Survey (2008–2013) and 1980 decennial Census. Figures by generation status limited to two-parent households with children aged 16 and under. Figures are limited to households where head of household is between 25 and 54 years old.

family than those in two-parent households with no significant differences by socioeconomic status.

Living with Intermarried Parents

Intermarriage is a key indicator of assimilation. It is also an indicator that by definition requires a sample restricted to households with two-parent married couples. Table 4 describes our sample of these households. It is noteworthy that our sample is centered around children, so intermarried couples without children are excluded from the analyses.

Intermarriage is a more common parental circumstance for the third generation in 2010 relative to the second generation in 1980. While just 7.5

percent of second-generation Hispanic children in 1980 were growing up in households with parents of different ethnoracial origins, that figure is 28.5 percent for the third generation in 2010. Asians also show significant intergenerational growth in the proportion growing up in households headed by an intermarried couple. In 1980, 20 percent of second-generation Asian children lived in such households, but in 2010, 62 percent of the third generation living with married parents had parents of different ethnoracial origins. Recall that we use a conservative estimate of intermarriage, counting only as intermarriage unions between Hispanics and non-Hispanics; and between Asians and non-Asians. Thus, the significant rise in intermarriage between the two periods should be regarded as particularly significant.

The findings here should also be regarded as significant in view of immigration-driven compositional changes in population that might significantly limit intergenerational changes in the proportion of Asians and Hispanics growing up in intermarried households. Immigration from Asia and Latin America after 1980 increased dramatically, changing the opportunity structure (Blau 1977) such that Asians and Hispanics have even greater chances of findings marriage partners of the same origin. Other research shows that large waves of Asian and Latin American immigration did indeed slow intermarriage rates for the second generation (Qian and Lichter 2011). In spite of these immigration-driven compositional changes, which likely limited intermarriage, we still uncovered a dramatic increase in the proportion of third-generation children, relative to the second generation 30 years earlier, that is living in households with intermarried parents in spite of ongoing immigration. While whites serve as the societal standard in these analyses, it is important to note that the proportion of children growing up in households with white parents who have a nonwhite parent has tripled, from 3.1 percent of the third-plus generation in 1980, to 9.3 percent of the fourth-plus generation in 2010.

Using this same sample of two-parent households, we now turn to multivariate analysis to examine the predictors of living with intermarried parents. Table 5 includes the odds ratios of children in Hispanic households (Models 1 and 2) and in Asian households (Models 3 and 4) living with intermarried parents in 1980 and 2010, relative to whites in the same time periods.[8]

[8]Age is included in the model to control for differences in age distribution across groups. In Model 1, the age variable indicates that children at older ages are less likely to be in intermarried households than those at younger ages.

TABLE 5
ODDS RATIOS OF HAVING INTERMARRIED PARENTS (TWO-PARENT HOUSEHOLDS), CHILDREN WITH AT LEAST ONE HISPANIC PARENT OR AT LEAST ONE ASIAN PARENT

	Children with at least 1 Hispanic Parent (1)	Children with at least 1 Hispanic Parent (2)	Children with at least 1 Asian Parent (3)	Children with at least 1 Asian Parent (4)
Year (1 = 2010)	2.852***	2.834***	3.592***	3.484***
Generation (1 = 3rd generation in 2010; 2nd generation in 1980)	2.466***	2.252***	8.169***	7.147***
Year × generation status	1.631***	1.659***	2.039***	2.045***
Age	0.974***	0.975***	0.981**	0.980**
Mother's education (1 = bachelor's degree)	1.360***	1.370***	0.633***	0.655***
Region (ref: Northeast)				
Midwest		0.808*		1.164
South		0.932		1.508***
West		1.198		2.076***
Constant	0.039***	0.040***	0.041***	0.029***
Observations	148,455	148,455	112,823	112,823
Log likelihood	−9.194e+06	−9.169e+06	−6.477e+06	−6.413e+06

Source: Authors' calculations of March Current Population Survey (2008–2013) and 1980 decennial Census.
Notes: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

Model 1 shows that children in 2010 are 2.85 times more likely to live in an intermarried household than those in 1980. Children with at least one Hispanic parent are 2.46 times more likely to be living with intermarried parents than the white reference group. By 2010, third-generation children have 1.6 times greater odds of living in households headed by an intermarried couple relative to second-generation children in 1980. The results also show that children with college-educated mothers have 1.3 times the odds of living in an intermarried household relative to those children living with mothers who have less than a bachelor's degree. Results show that geographic differences do not significantly shape the odds of living in intermarried households for Hispanic generations relative to whites. The only statistically significant geographic difference is children in the Midwest who have lower odds of living in intermarried households compared to children in the Northeast.

When the analysis shifts to the sample that includes children living with at least one Asian parent, Model 3 shows that all children in 2010 have roughly 3.59 greater odds living with intermarried parents than in 1980. And the odds of living in an intermarried household are 8.1 times greater for children with at least one Asian parent than for whites. Similar to households with at least one Hispanic parent, the odds of living in an

intermarried household between second-generation children in 1980 and third-generation children in 2010 increases among children with an Asian parent (2.03 times greater for the third generation). Unlike Hispanics, Model 3 shows that third-generation Asian children with a college-educated mother have lower odds of living with intermarried parents than those with a mother who has less than a college education. Additionally, in contrast to Hispanics, there are significant geographic differences in intermarriage rates for those children living with at least one Asian parent. In Model 4, children living in the South and the West have greater odds of living in an intermarried household than children in the Northeast.

Ethnoracial Identification of Children in Intermarried Households

When parents are intermarried, they may see themselves as having a wider array of choices for how to label their children on surveys like the US Census or CPS. We cannot infer too much from these labels about the identity of the children, for their parents chose the categories for the children, and the category labels themselves may not capture the complexities of a lived ethnoracial identity (Dowling 2014). Nonetheless, the labels

TABLE 6
RACIAL/ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OF CHILDREN IN INTERMARRIED HOUSEHOLDS BY GENERATION

One Hispanic parent	Child racial/Ethnic identification			Share of Couples
	Hispanic	Non-Hispanic		
1980				
Intermarried Hispanics	62.2%	37.8%	100%	
Mother, Hispanic	59.8%	40.2%	100%	61.6%
Father, Hispanic	65.9%	34.1%	100%	38.4%
2010				
Intermarried Hispanics	75.6%	24.4%	100%	
Mother, Hispanic	74.2%	25.8%	100%	49.4%
Father, Hispanic	76.9%	23.1%	100%	50.6%
One Asian parent	Asian[a]	Non-Asian		Shared of couples
1980				
Intermarried Asians	44.4%	55.6%	100%	
Mother, Asian	44.6%	55.4%	100%	83.1%
Father, Asian	43.7%	56.3%	100%	16.9%
2010				
Intermarried Asians	81.9%	18.1%	100%	
Mother, Asian	82.9%	17.1%	100%	68.1%
Father, Asian	79.6%	20.4%	100%	31.9%

Source: Authors' calculations of March Current Population Survey (2008–2013) and 1980 decennial Census.Notes: [a]Including those who were identified as Asian only and as Asian in combination with one or more other races.

that parents select for their children are suggestive of broader trends in the salience of ethnoracial identities across populations. Using a sample restricted to children living with intermarried parents, Table 6 reports ethnoracial labels by the combination of parents and the frequency of the labels these parents give to their children. We show rates separately for which parent is of a particular ethnoracial background to determine whether gender plays a role in determining the ethnoracial label given to their children.

Among intermarried couples with a Hispanic parent in 1980, 62 percent of second-generation children were given a Hispanic label. In 2010, third-generation children living with one Hispanic and one non-Hispanic were labeled Hispanic *more* often than second-generation children three decades earlier. Among third-generation children in 2010, 75 percent are given a Hispanic label. In both 1980 and 2010, although more pronounced in 1980, those children with Hispanic fathers were more likely to given a Hispanic label than those with a Hispanic mother. The increase in identifying their children as Hispanic could be associated with an increasing intermarriage rate for Hispanic men. However, there is not a statistically significant difference in the use of the Hispanic label when the mother is Hispanic versus when the father is Hispanic.

Asian children living with intermarried parents show different patterns in some respects. Among second-generation children in 1980, when one parent was Asian and the other was non-Asian, children were given an Asian label 44 percent of the time. Thus, second-generation children in 1980 growing up in intermarried households that had at least one Asian parent were less often given an Asian label than children going up in Hispanic households with at least one Hispanic parent were given a Hispanic label in 1980. Turning to 2010, it is important to recall that parents in 2010 could use the CPS to indicate that their children had multiple racial backgrounds instead of choosing just one race category, as they were forced to do in 1980. Thus, parents had the opportunity to identify their children with *both* their Asian and non-Asian ancestries in 2010. What we report from 2010 should be read as the proportion of third-generation children living in an intermarried household who were given *any* Asian (whether alone or in combination with another race category) label by their parents. Looking over time and across generations, patterns of identification of children living in Asian intermarried households are similar to their Hispanic counterparts. Third-generation children growing up in intermarried households with at least one Asian parent in

TABLE 7
ODDS RATIOS PREDICTING CHILD'S ETHNORACIAL IDENTIFICATION AMONG CHILDREN IN INTERMARRIED
HOUSEHOLDS

	CHILD identified as Hispanic among intermarried households with one Hispanic parent (1)	CHILD identified as Asian among intermarried households with one Asian parent (2)
Year (1 = 2010)	1.496***	4.569***
Age	0.979**	0.962*
Mother's race (ref: white, non-Hispanic)		
Same as child (Hispanic)	0.888	
Same as child (Asian)		1.436
Other race	1.185	1.775
Mother's education (1 = bachelor's degree)	0.809*	1.335
Poverty status (1 = below poverty line)	0.908	0.496
Region (ref: Northeast)		
Midwest	0.980	2.590**
South	0.828	1.772
West	1.038	3.181***
Constant	2.845***	0.283***
Observations	38,440	8,598
Log likelihood	−3.563e+06	−1.010e+06

Source: Authors' calculations of March Current Population Survey (2008–2013) and 1980 decennial Census.
Notes: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

2010 were much more often given an Asian label than in 1980, and relative to not being given an Asian label at all. Indeed, 81 percent of these children were given an Asian label. It is important to emphasize the results are almost surely driven in part by the option to choose more than one category in 2010. Had that option been available in 1980, the increase we observe might not appear so dramatic. Still, we observe a pattern of not just retention of an Asian or Hispanic label for children growing up in intermarried households, but also a pattern of growing prevalence of those choices over time and across generations.

Turing to a multivariate analysis, we model the determinants of the ethnoracial labels that parents assigned to their children. Table 7 displays the results as odds ratios.

Looking at the results for intermarried households with at least one Hispanic parent, third-generation children in 2010 have 1.5 times greater odds of being labeled Hispanic relative to second-generation children growing up in intermarried households in 1980. Older children see only a slight, but statistically significant reduction in their odds of being labeled Hispanic. The gender–ethnoracial combination of parents has no

statistically significant effect. Mother's education has only a slight effect, wherein having a mother with a bachelor's degree reduces the odds of being labeled Hispanic by roughly 20 percent. Poverty status does not have a statistically significant effect. Lastly, geographic differences are not significant.

A somewhat similar pattern emerges in intermarried households with at least one Asian parent (column 2). Third-generation children growing up in these households have odds of being labeled Asian, either alone or in combination with another racial category, that are 4.56 times greater than the odds for second-generation children in such households in 1980.[9] Intermarried couples with an Asian mother are not significantly more likely to label their children as Asian than intermarried couple with an Asian father. Secondly, the socioeconomic status of the household, proxied by mother's education and poverty status, does not have a statistically significant impact on labeling their child as Asian. There are significant regional effects: Children living in the Midwest are 2.59 times more likely than those in the Northeast of being labeled Asian. It is even higher for those in the West (3.18 times greater odds) relative to the Northeast.

DISCUSSION

What is clear from these analyses is that the new third generation, compared to their second-generation parents 30 years earlier, is growing up in households with parents who have more education, are less often living below the poverty line, earn more, are more often intermarried, and they are less likely to live with extended family members. Those intergenerational differences suggest a pattern of assimilation that conforms to a classic, straight-line model developed to explain the assimilation of Southern and Eastern European immigrants. Although the direction of the patterns we identify shows more similarities than differences between Hispanics

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[9]It is important to note here that our supplementary analysis (available upon request) shows that the increase in the proportion of children who receive a nonwhite label across generation cohorts is not driven by an increase in marriages between nonwhites. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of intermarriage combinations in 1980 involve whites and Asians (28%) or whites and Hispanics (45%). Those percentages decline only slightly in 2010 (38% and 23%, respectively). Marriage between Hispanics and people who identified themselves as Other accounted for 11 percent of all intermarriages in 1980 and 18 percent in 2010. Marriage between Asians and people who identified as Other grew from 4 percent in 1980 to 6 percent in 2010.

and Asians, there are important group differences. In general, Asians in 1980 had higher socioeconomic attainment than any group, including native-born whites, and they generally experienced an increase in their socioeconomic circumstances by 2010. Those differences are perhaps not surprising given that the first-generation immigrants of these groups have very different starting points. Indeed, large segments of the Asian immigrant population are "hyperselected": they have higher levels of education and income than nonmigrants in their home country and are higher than the average individual in the United States (Lee and Zhou 2015). The opposite is true for Mexicans, who make up a majority of Hispanics. The relative position of the new third generation, as indicated by the kinds of households they grow up in, reflects those starting points. The differences also show up in group disparities in the proportion living with two parents.[10] Households with the Asian second generation in 1980 and third generation in 2010 are more likely to be headed by two parents than households with Hispanic children and white, non-Hispanic children. But generation-cohort changes within groups show slight declines over time. There is only a modest drop of two percentage points (or 75–73%) in the proportion of third-generation Hispanics living with both parents compared to second-generation Hispanics in 1980. The same is true for Asians — there is just a five percentage points (93–88.2%). It is notable that these declines are also evident among native-born whites, who exhibit the largest drop among the three groups at eight percentage points (88.0–80.9%) in the number of children living with both parents in 2010 compared to 1980. The decline in the share of two-parent households across all groups suggests a shift in societal norms around the timing of marriage and childbearing rather than a shift arising from socioeconomic or cultural differences. But overall, the household circumstances of the new third generation do not suggest a "third-generation decline" in which the fortunes of the third generation fall behind the fortunes of the second generation three decades prior. Of course, our results cannot speak to individual adult outcomes for the new third generation, which may yet evince a

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[10]See McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) for an analysis of the effect of growing up with a single parent.

third-generation decline. But if household circumstances are any indicator, such a decline does not appear to be on the horizon.

More opaque is the significance of changes in patterns of the identification of children when they live in intermarried households. Recall from our findings that over time and across generations, third-generation children in 2010 who were growing up in a household with one Hispanic and one non-Hispanic parent had *greater* odds of their parents assigning them a Hispanic label than second-generation children in intermarried households three decades before; likewise third-generation children with one Asian and one non-Asian parent had *greater* odds of having their parents assign them an Asian label than a second generation in an intermarried household 30 years earlier. It is important to keep in mind that parents in 2010 did not have to choose between an Asian label and a non-Asian label; they could choose multiple racial categories to identify their children. In fact, the most popular way to identify these children was to select multiple racial categories, including one of the Asian subgroups (60%). Existing literature suggests that those patterns may have several, non-mutually exclusive explanations. It could be that the popularity of identifying children with multiple racial categories among these households owes to growing recognition of mixed-race identity as a distinctive form of ethnoracial identity. Interviews of individuals who have one white and one Asian parent show that they express flexibility in the kinds of identities that they claim and express (Lee and Bean 2010). Among the flexible options is a distinctly multiracial identity that has gained growing public recognition over the last two decades (DaCosta 2007). Another possibility is that these patterns reflect the coming of a symbolic ethnicity — "a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behavior" (Gans 1979, 9) — among the post-1965 immigrants. Ample research shows that an ethnoracial identity remained among the later generation southern of the Eastern European immigration wave, but that ethnoracial identity was a dim part of individual and collective identity (Alba 1990; Waters 1990). Among the new third generation, it could be that claimed ethnoracial attachments are symbolic and not deeply felt.

Finally, it may be that an institutionalized value of diversity and multiculturalism encourages a strong attachment to an ethnoracial identity such that the new third generation will remain strongly tied to a nonwhite ethnoracial identity (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015). As

the Southern and Eastern European-origin third generation was coming of age, a nascent form of multiculturalism shaped a desire for them to be more attached to an ethnoracial identity, even if that attachment ultimately turned out to be symbolic (Jacobson 2006). Assimilation today may no longer be characterized by a strong, positive correlation between intergenerational change in social, political, and economic dimensions of life. Postindustrial societies, like the United States, allow far greater latitude of individual identities, including ethnoracial identities, and even design institutional policy to embrace, celebrate, and sometimes reward wide-ranging expressions of those identities (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015). A positive valuation of ethnoracial identification is embodied in an ideology of multiculturalism that infuses new civic traditions of American identity premised on recognition and pride in the varied immigrant origins that make up American identity and culture (Schildkraut 2010).

On top of this ideology, patterns of contemporary immigration are at play. Ethnographic work suggests that the large-scale immigration from Latin American and Asia gives the US-born individuals who share an ethnoracial origin with these immigrants greater access to ethnoracial symbols and practices that make people feel more attached to an ethnoracial identity. This "replenishment" (Jiménez 2010) is especially true for the Mexican-origin population, which saw dramatic immigration-driven growth between the periods from which we drew our data. Indeed, it may be that immigration-driven compositional changes in the constituent groups that make up the Hispanic category are partly responsible for our findings. In supplementary analyses not reported in the tables, we find that Mexican children made up 67 percent of Hispanic children in second-generation-headed households with a Hispanic parent in 1980 and 74 percent of Hispanic children in third-generation-headed households with a Hispanic parent in 2010; while the Puerto Rican share fell from 11 percent to 5 percent and the Cuban share also fell from 4 percent to 2 percent. Other Hispanics were 18 percent in 1980 and 19 percent in 2010. Likewise, it could be that group-specific compositional changes among the largest Asian subgroups drive patterns among Asians. Unfortunately, the CPS does not identify individual Asian subgroups until 2013, the final year of our CPS sample.[11] The result of these ideological and immigration-driven

[11]These compositional changes in the Hispanic population are not a result of new immigration. Our analyses in 2010 include only the US-born, and so the compositional changes are due entirely to fertility and mortality.

demographic changes may be assimilation to an ethnoracially flecked mainstream in which belonging is premised on recognition of and identification with an immigrant ethnoracial ancestry (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015; Jiménez 2017).

These scenarios are speculative, of course. The census and CPS are not well suited for inferring the meaning of ethnoracial identity of the new third generation, as the data reflect choices parents made about how to identify their children and survey categories cannot capture the complexities of a lived identity. But the patterns that we observe suggest that the new third generation, in spite of having multiple ancestries, are not pulling away from an attachment to the ancestry of their immigrant grandparents. Even if there is an alloyed version of that attachment, indicated by parents selecting multiple racial categories, an attachment endures nonetheless.

A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE NEW THIRD GENERATION

This analysis of the new third generation offers a more temporally complete glimpse of post-1965 assimilation, but it is far from exhaustive. Our analysis ought to raise more questions than answers, spurring assimilation researchers to understand the new third-generation outcomes in far greater breadth and depth. Our analyses, in combination with our reading of the existing literature, suggest a research agenda for the next generation of assimilation research. This agenda points toward the need for a significant data-gathering effort as well as careful consideration of factors likely to affect the third generation.

Tracking the New Third Generation

As our analysis indicates, there are severe data limitations in examining the new third-generation experience. Large government surveys such as the decennial Census do not enable the identification of a third generation at all, asking only whether the individual filling out the Census and the other members of the household are US-born.[12] The CPS data upon which we draw confines the identification of the new third generation to

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[12]Although the American Community Survey calculates parent and child nativity, the microdata include no information on whether a parent's "own children" are US-born, nor are these microdata publicly available.

children residing in the same household as their second-generation parents. Moreover, the CPS has a limited number of variables that scholars can use to examine important assimilation outcomes, and the sampling strategy makes examining important factors, such as those related to place of residence, extremely difficult, if not impossible. There are other sources of data that capture a unique third and even fourth generation, such as the Mexican American Study Project (Ortiz and Telles 2011) and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (Rumbaut et al. 2008). But because these two data sets include adults, they capture the third- and later-generation descendants of a previous wave of Mexican immigrants, and not of the post-1965 immigration wave.

What is required to advance an understanding of the new third generation, then, is data that allow for the identification of the post-1965 third generation as adults and that include information on the kinds of individual-level assimilation outcomes that other standard surveys lack. Existing data-gathering efforts on the second generation — the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey (CILS) and the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) — are models for similar endeavors that could be emulated to study the new third generation. CILS samples more than 5,000 children of immigrants in the Miami and San Diego metropolitan areas in 1992, when these children were in their early teens, and re-interviewed most of the original sample three years later, and again in 2001–2003. CILS also includes parent surveys and in-depth interviews with select survey respondents. ISGMNY is a survey and interview sample of 1.5 (arrived before the age of 12)- and second-generation individuals living in the New York metropolitan area. The sample also includes native-born comparisons groups, including whites, Puerto Ricans, and African Americans.

The features of these studies that distinguish each from the other — longitudinal design; non-post-1965 comparison groups — as well as similarities across the studies — qualitative and quantitative data; contextual data; a range of assimilation measures — could be incorporated into a single study of the new third generation.

The New Geography of Assimilation

There are also more substantive imperatives for studying the new third generation. A notable shortcoming of existing second-generation studies is

a decided lack of attention to the second-generation experiences in new immigrant gateways in the US South and Midwest. Although there has been a spate of rich studies examining the dynamics of settlement and intergroup relations in the new gateways, notably absent are studies that examine the second-generation experience in these new gateways (for a notable exception, see Hernández-León and Lakhani 2013; Tran and Valdez 2015). That empirical omission is even more glaring with the rise of the third generation. Assimilation scholars have pointed out that there is good reason to believe that the immigrant and second-generation experiences may differ in the new gateways because of the unique economic, political, and social histories of these regions (Waters and Jiménez 2005; Tran and Valdez 2015; Marrow 2009; Massey 2008). Indeed, the geography variables show up as significant predictors in each of our multivariate models. Although these variables are blunt instruments for gaining leverage on the effect of geographic context, they do show that assimilation outcomes are unfolding at different speeds, depending on where the new third generation is growing up. Explaining exactly how the regional differences are reflected in intergenerational assimilation into the third generation remains a pressing area of inquiry, especially given the regionalization of the economy and the related educational and economic opportunities (Chetty et al. 2014b).

The New Third Generation as a Cohort

The new third generation will be coming of age under historical circumstances that may shape their experiences in very particular ways. These cohort-specific conditions are especially meaningful when making comparisons between third-generation individuals descended from previous waves of immigrants. For example, the third-generation descendants of the Southern and Eastern European immigrant wave were mostly baby boomers who came of age at a time of relative economic equality (compared to other points in US history, including today), massive social upheaval, and very little new immigration. Those historical events almost certainly formed what it meant to be a grandchild of immigrants in ways that shaped assimilation outcomes.

Likewise, today's new third generation will come of age as a group of individuals who have in common not just the experience of being third generation but also being part of a cohort that experiences a set of historical events at similar stages in the life course. The specifics of those events

have yet to unfold, but there are social and economic trends underway that are likely to shape the extent and kind of their assimilation: high income and wealth inequality; contestation over multiculturalism and diversity policies; a two-term black president; the Trump presidency; mass imprisonment; the Internet age; more liberal attitudes about interethnoracial dating and marriage; multi-ethnoracial identity; low levels of military service; disinvestment from public education; and the post-9/11 focus on security. The effects of inequality may already show up in shifting norms about age of marriage and childbearing, which, even in our data, shape the household circumstances of Hispanics, Asians, and whites, although not to equal degrees. The recognition and support of wide-ranging individual identities, including ethnoracial identities (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015), may also show up in our analysis in the greater propensity for new third-generation children living with intermarried parents to receive a nonwhite label in 2010, relative to a second generation living with intermarriage parents in 1980.

Gendered Paths of Assimilation

The overwhelming focus of assimilation research is on how ethnoracial origin and generation structure assimilation outcomes. But previous research on the second generation highlights how gender significantly shapes assimilation outcomes (Park and Myers 2010; Park, Nawyn, and Benetsky 2015). A pressing question for the next generation of assimilation research is whether and how gender continues to shape socioeconomic outcomes as part of the assimilation process. The new third generation may very well be swept up in more secular gendered patterns. But there may also be gendered dimensions of their lives related specifically to their third-generation status and ethnoracial origins. Our analysis points to two such dimensions. Among the households headed by a single parent, women head the majority. Hispanics far more often live in households headed by a single mother compared to whites and Asians. And in households headed by two parents of different ethnoracial origins, where one spouse is Asian, it is far more often the mother who is Asian. What, then, does it mean for group outcomes when so many third-generation Hispanics are being raised by a single mother? And how is the collective "mixed" childhood experience shaped by the fact that it is overwhelmingly the mother who is nonwhite and the father is white? As our analysis and other work show, ethnoracial origin is

not the only category potentially marking differences in assimilation; gender may also be central to that segmentation.

The New Third Generation Followed by a New Immigrant Generation?

The new third-generation experience will also be determined by factors endogenous to the ethnoracial groups that shape group composition. The third generation represents a temporal march away from the immigrant generation. But the new third generation may nonetheless continue to navigate contexts in which they have varying degrees of contact with immigrants of the same ethnoracial origin. With few exceptions (see, e.g., Erdmans 1998), Southern and Eastern European immigration all but ended with the passage of the 1924 Immigration Quotas Act, which severely limited legal immigration from most parts of Europe. The decidedly US-born heavy composition of Southern and Eastern European ethnoracial groups was a likely contributor to rising intermarriage rates because there were simply fewer individuals of the same ethnoracial origin to marry (Blau 1977), and it almost certainly shaped the symbolic form and content of ethnoracial identity (Waters 1990; Jiménez 2010). Whether immigration from their grandparents' homeland continues or abates will shape the exposure that the new third generation has to ethnoracially linked practices and symbols; the content of ethnoracial stereotypes; ethnoracial prejudice; and the composition of networks and the availability of romantic partners (Tuan 1998; Jiménez 2010; Tsuda 2016).

Our findings point toward one potential effect of these immigration patterns. Third-generation children growing up with intermarried parents have greater odds of being assigned to the ethnoracial ancestry of their immigrant grandparents than their second-generation counterparts 30 years earlier. The questions remain: How does the new third generation construct and assign meaning to their ethnoracial identities? An important factor is whether immigration continues, and whether the corresponding salience of some ethnoracial origins makes particular forms of identity more accessible. For the Mexican-American new third generation, the largest subgroup in the new third generation, the future flows of Mexican immigration are very much in doubt. There is now negative net Mexican migration to the United States (Gonzalez-Barrera 2015). In contrast, Asian immigration is on the rise, and there are now more immigrants entering the United States

from Asia than from Latin America (Pew Research Center 2015). However, migration patterns unfold, those patterns will significantly shape how the new third generation forms their ethnoracial identities.

CONCLUSION

Now is the time for assimilation scholars to turn their attention to the new third generation — the grandchildren of the post-1965 immigrants — with the same vigor that these scholars have studied the new second generation for the past two decades. Debates about the form and content of the assimilation of the post-1965 immigrants are largely at a stalemate because the focus on the second generation offers a temporally truncated picture of assimilation. With the rise of the new third generation, social scientists have an unprecedented opportunity to examine, in detail, how the next chapter of American assimilation is writing itself. We offer a first look. Our analysis suggests that assimilationist proceeding apace, with the new third generation in 2010 living in households that are socioeconomically better off, more likely to be headed by intermarried parents, and less likely to have extended family members present. We also find that identification with the ethnoracial background of the immigrant grandparents appears to endure, and may even be more prevalent in the third generation. While instructive, our analysis hardly offered definitive evidence of a new third generation that may be on a path of assimilation similar to one that previous waves traveled, or one that looks more like the segmented assimilation paths identified in some studies of the second generation. Settling that debate requires the emergence of a new generation of assimilation research that further explores the questions implied by our analysis and offered in our research agenda.

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