FRIENDS OR FOES? HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT ALLIES AFFECT THE PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION IN THE U.S. CONGRESS*

Susan Olzak, Sarah A. Soule, Marion Coddou, and John Muñoz†

This article considers the role of social movement allies in Congress in advancing pro-environmental legislation. We argue that compared to sponsors of legislation who hold moderate views, sponsors with extreme ideological positions will be less likely to produce legislation desired by the environmental movement. We also argue that protest and organizational advocacy by constituents will increase the rate at which sponsors enact environmental legislation. Using event history techniques that follow over 12,000 environmental bills from 1973-1996, we find support for the argument that environmental bills are more successful when sponsored by legislators who have environmental voting records closer to the median voter in Congress, compared to bills sponsored by representatives holding more extreme positions. We also find that the number of environmental lobbyist organizations has a positive effect on the speed of enactment of environmental legislation, but that protest by constituents does not affect the speed of the bill’s passage.

Do movement allies in Congress affect the rate of policy change desired by social movements? Most scholars predict that elite allies of social movements are important because they both introduce legislation that is favorable to the goals of the movement and help to shepherd bills through the policy process (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, and Su 2010; Andrews and Gaby 2015; Meyer 2004). However, there are many studies showing that the presence of elite allies of movements has no (or even a negative) effect on the policy goals of movements (Burrell 1995; Lilie, Handberg Jr., and Lowrey 1982; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Soule and Olzak 2004). To help make sense of these discrepant findings, we draw on a host of empirical findings emphasizing how characteristics of bill sponsors in Congress influence the fate of legislation (for reviews, see Adler and Wilkerson 2005; Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Burstein, Bauldry, and Froese 2005). Of particular interest is the work of Krehbiel (1998), which shows that bills sponsored by Members of Congress (MCs) that are closer to the median ideological position of Congress are more successful than bills sponsored by members who are outliers or who hold relatively extreme views. We build on this insight to develop the argument that moderate forms of social movement advocacy (lobbyist organizations) and moderate positions held by bill sponsors (closer to the median environmental position of Congress) will be associated with the speed of passage of bills in Congress.

* NSF Collaborative Grants SES-0620577, SES-9911296, and SES-9709356 to the first two authors supported this research. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2012 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Denver, Colorado. All of the authors would like to thank Madison Bell, Brian Cook, Jonathan Haynes, Chandler Johnson, Thomas Scher, John Scott, Wenkai Kay, Vanessa Gaines, Chelsea Barabas, Liz Warburton, Denny Won, Rosie Winn, Chuong Phan, and Noona Oh for their excellent research assistance. In addition, we thank Bob Brulle, Keith Krehbiel, Andy Walder, and Jonathan Woon for providing useful suggestions on earlier drafts.
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DOI 10.17813/1086-671X-21-2-213
CORE ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTHESES

To examine our argument that policy passage favors moderates, we first investigate the argument that sponsors of bills holding moderate views will positively influence policy success, when compared to more extreme bill sponsors (for a review, see Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech 2009). We then examine the impact of three different forms of social movement activity on the speed of bill passage (proenvironment protest, anti-environment protest, and lobbyist organizing).

Elite Allies and Median Voter Influence

By definition, social movements have less political power than elite policymakers. The majority of social movement theories predict that the elite allies are critical to movement success, either by affecting outcomes directly by their votes or indirectly through their influence on public opinion (Amenta et al. 2010; Meyer 2004). Such perspectives hold that elite lawmakers whose voting records indicate support for a movement will enact promovement legislation more effectively than lawmakers who have taken positions less favorable to a movement (Agnone 2007).

Several empirical findings in studies of the women’s movement in the U.S. and elsewhere cast doubt on this perspective, however. For example, Olzak and Uhrig (2001: 708-9) find that neither of the left-leaning allies (Social Democratic Party or Green Party) had any significant impact on the women’s movement in West Germany. Furthermore, while Burrell (1995) and Lilie et al. (1982) argue that female elected officials and Democrats should favor positions taken by the women’s movement, Soule and Olzak (2004: 489) find that neither Democrats nor female legislators contributed positively to ERA ratification (and effects found were in the negative direction). These results lead us to question whether movement allies in power are always beneficial to social movements (or whether they might just be fair-weather friends).

Studies of the “median voter” in Congress provide an explanation for why elite allies of movements may not, in fact, help movements in their quest for legislation favoring movement goals. In Krehbiel’s (1998) view, the median position on an issue in Congress has a strong influence on how any single MC will vote on the issue. This literature implies that to the extent that sponsors of legislation deviate substantially (in either a positive or negative direction) from the median voting record on the environment in Congress, they will meet more opposition and experience less success in getting their legislation passed.

Empirical evidence in the political science literature also suggests that the ideological extremism of a bill’s sponsor is associated with failure to get bills passed, at least in the Senate (Moore and Thomas 1991). This finding suggests that well-known movement allies may be less likely to get their bills enacted, which runs counter to the more conventional “allies in power” view. Given this literature, we expect that the rate of passage of environmental legislation will be hampered by (a) a sponsor’s previous rating as an proenvironmental legislator, and by (b) the absolute magnitude of a sponsor’s deviation from the median League of Conservation Voter (LCV) score of other legislators (net of the effect of a sponsor’s previous specialization of bills on the environment, position as committee chair, and membership in a chamber’s majority party). In the language of event-history analysis, we refer to the hazard rate to indicate the instantaneous probability that a bill will be enacted over some very small units of time (e.g., days).

Hypothesis 1A: Bills sponsored by MCs whose past voting records are more strongly allied with the environmental movement will have a lower hazard rate of enactment compared to sponsors who are less strongly allied with the environmental movement.

Hypothesis 1B: Bills sponsored by MCs whose past environmental voting diverges significantly from the median voting record on the environment in Congress will have a lower hazard
rate of enactment than bills sponsored by MCs whose voting records are congruent with the median voting record on the environment in Congress.

The Impact of Social Movement Activity

Protest Activity by Constituents. If one of the main goals of MCs is to be reelected, then they must be sensitive to the demands of constituents, including those from vocal movement activists. Such self-interest likely motivates politicians to move proposed legislation through Congress more quickly, especially if they can demonstrate that the new laws they have sponsored address their constituents’ concerns. However, if more countermovement protest occurs in a MC’s home state, legislators may avoid taking unfavorable positions and risking reelection. The claim that the effect of countermovement activity on promovement legislative outcomes will be more negative than positive also resonates with research on the politics of attention and with studies of media attention more generally (Andrews and Caren 2010; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).

Scholars from the opportunity structure perspective often claim that protests by social movement advocates are effective in determining key policy outcomes, however the empirical picture is decidedly more mixed (Amenta et al. 2010; Meyer 2004). Findings diverge for both conceptual and methodological reasons. First, there is little agreement about which activities of social movements have an impact on the policy process (Andrews and Edwards 2004). Second, while some scholars treat all forms of advocacy as equally effective at influencing the policy process, only a handful of studies have directly measured lobbyist influence on policy outcomes (Burstein 2014; Baumgartner et al. 2009). Third, still others warn of the risk of overstating movement strength by omitting measures of countermovement strength (Cress and Snow 2000; Gillion 2013; Olzak and Soule 2009; Rafail, Soule, and McCarthy 2012; Soule 2004).

In an analysis that tackles many of these issues, Burstein (2014) tracks sixty unique policy proposals from inception (referral to committee) through to enactment. He finds that protest has a significant and positive effect on the enactment of policy proposal legislation introduced during the 101st Congress (1989-90). This result is striking in part because the analysis includes a wide range of other measures of advocacy, including hearings testimony, editorial endorsements, supportive and opposing speeches, and letters to the editors on proposal topics. In weighing all of this evidence, we expect a positive effect of proenvironmental protest, but a negative effect of antienvironmental protest on promovement legislation:

Hypothesis 2A: Increases in proenvironmental protests in a state will increase the hazard rate of enactment of environmental bills sponsored by MCs from that state.

Hypothesis 2B: Increases in antienvironmental protests in a state will decrease the hazard rate of enactment of environmental bills sponsored by MCs from that state.

Lobbyist Organizations. In addition to protest, successful social movements use a variety of organizational vehicles to influence the policy process (Andrews and Edwards 2004, 2005; Burstein and Freudenberg 1978; Burstein and Linton 2002). Evidence supporting this claim suggests that a wide variety of advocacy groups and organizations enhance the visibility and legitimacy of an issue and frame it as a local social problem. Thus, we argue that state-based proenvironmental lobby organizations offer powerful reelection incentives for MCs to produce legislation that has been evaluated as an effective solution to pressing environmental issues in a state (Brulle, Turner, Carmichael, and Jenkins 2007).

Following research by Baumgartner and Leech (2001), we believe that the activities of lobbying organizations influence the fate of environmental policy net of the effects of protest activity. Since lobbyists tend to specialize in specific issue areas, they are deeply embedded in issue networks that support legislators by providing critical and timely background infor-
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mation used to prepare bills, amendments, press releases, and speeches (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Furthermore, lobbyists rely on legislators to submit their ideas to Congress, while legislators depend on lobbyists to write bills and provide technical assistance (Oleszek 2001). Contrary to the popular view, empirical studies show that lobbyists usually do not directly try to “buy” or persuade all MCs, but instead act strategically to target legislators who are recognized as allies or who are undecided (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Witko 2006). This interdependency suggests that the values, activities, and actual work products of lawmakers and lobbyists overlap considerably:

Hypothesis 3: The presence of larger numbers of proenvironmental lobbyist organizations registered in a state will increase the hazard rate of enactment of environmental bills sponsored by MCs from that state.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

We analyze these hypotheses with event history data on 12,238 bills with proenvironmental aims introduced in Congress from 1973 through the end of 1996. It is important to note that this study diverges from research traditions that analyze specific roll call votes or focus mainly on legislation that has been enacted (e.g., see Baumgartner and Jones 2002; Binder 2003; Poole and Rosenthal 1991, 1997; Quirk and Binder 2005). The roll-call tradition is often limited by a cross-sectional design, while studies of public laws are limited to describing the conditions that held when a bill was enacted. In contrast, our research uses an event-history design and follows the entire life history of a bill that has been introduced, regardless of whether or not it is eventually enacted into law. Because we analyze a population of bills at risk of passing, we avoid sampling on the dependent variable.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the hazard rate, indicated by the amount of time that elapses from the exact date that a bill is introduced until it is passed (signed into law by the president), or censored on the last day of the Congress if the bill does not pass. The unit of analysis is an environmental bill introduced on a specific date by a primary sponsor representing constituents in his or her home state. In this way, covariates on characteristics of states, social movement activity among constituents, and sponsor characteristics of a bill can be analyzed simultaneously.

Introducing a bill is evidently low cost, as any member of Congress can sponsor bills at any time, and there are few barriers to doing so (Adler and Wilkerson 2005, 2012; Soule and King 2006). We follow Adler and Wilkerson (2005) and others who assume that rapid passage of a bill requires more skill and effort by sponsors, compared to bills that take longer to pass (or that never pass) due to the strength of opposition, infighting, lack of sponsor power, committee deliberations, and other sources of institutional political inertia.

How should we identify an “environmental” bill? To gather data on environmental bills, we first selected all bills introduced from 1973-1996 identified by Adler and Wilkerson’s “Congressional Bills Project” as relevant to the environmental movement and crosslisted by the Policy Agendas Project (PAP). To the obvious topic code 700 (bills aimed at improving the environment) we added the following other subtopic codes: (806) Alternative and Renewable Energy; (807) Energy Conservation; (1902) International Resources Exploitation and Resources Agreement (including depletion of fish, recovery of seabed minerals, whaling); (2103) Resources, Public Lands, and Forest Management; and (2104) Water Resources Development and Research. We first conducted an exhaustive content analysis of bill summaries, and then crosschecked the relevance and valence of a bill against the League of Conservation listings of “most critical bills.” Through this winnowing process, we aim to focus on bills most relevant to the environmental movements and its allies.
As many have noted, lawmaking is often a messy and nonlinear process (Burstein 2014; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). For example, amendments can be added to bills at any point in the process that can effectively neutralize or even reverse a bill’s original intent. To avoid including bills intended to block or counter the environmental movement, we consulted the League of Conservation Voters Archive. In addition to scoring the environmental voting record of each MC, each year the LCV lists “critical” environmental bills and/or amendments to a bill, summarizes their intentions, and then designates whether a “yes” or “no” vote on that bill would be consistent with LCV proenvironmentalism. We read through each listing and deleted any bill from our risk set that the LCV listed as inconsistent with a proenvironmental position. We then consulted the Thomas website to validate bill summaries for all ambiguous or complicated cases (e.g., bills with multiple amendments and counter-amendments, see endnote 6). While not perfect, we believe that our strategy of consulting the LCV archives and amendment histories together strengthened our ability to identify those bills aimed at improving the environment and fostering conservation efforts and programs.

Despite the widespread scholarly attention to legislation, many analysts who follow proposed bills through a particular Congressional session have ignored the fact that bills with exactly the same wording can be introduced, even within the same Chamber (for exceptions, see Burstein et al. 2005; Thomas and Grofman 1993). Thomas and Grofman (1993) argue that prior to 1979, introducing duplicate bills was a relatively low-cost strategy that had few negative consequences because it was a common but undetected occurrence. However, after 1979, proposing a duplicate bill was rare, and there is a sharp drop in the number of redundant environmental bills. Conventional sources of data on Congressional legislation may therefore underestimate the likelihood that a given bill will be passed because they have ignored the presence of redundant bills (Burstein et al. 2005; Burstein 2014).

We take this redundancy into account to gain a more accurate picture of the legislative process. We first identified all environmental bills in Adler and Wilkerson’s (1973-1996) Congressional Bills Project using the topic codes listed. We then used bill numbers to download the text of each bill. We used Perl Script software to calculate a Jaccard coefficient of similarity for each pair of bills. Bills (within and across all Congressional sessions) that had 95 percent overlap in wording were classified as identical. We control for this “redundancy effect” by taking into account bills that have exactly the same wording as the focal bill, and we verified that these bills were also cross-listed as “exact duplicates” on the Thomas website. We then constructed a variable that indicates whether or not a focal bill has been preceded (across all sessions) by a duplicate bill with exactly the same wording.

We decided to analyze all bills directly relevant to the environmental movement’s aims, without prejudging a bill’s eventual importance or ineffectiveness. Critics might reasonably claim that not all bills are created equal and that some have a much bigger impact on the environment (Cox and Terry 2008: 65). This criticism had led some scholars to analyze only a small subset of the “most important bills.” At first glance, this strategy seems reasonable. However, we found that bills included in lists of the “most important” environmental legislation can be designated only after some time has elapsed (Olzak and Soule 2009). Further, such labels are assigned only after a bill becomes law. Thus, analyzing a sample of “most important bills” raises sample selection bias problems, since only a tiny fraction of bills introduced become enacted into law. We also note that it often takes years of court cases and written opinions for a final evaluation on whether or not a given piece of legislation has had a major impact on the environment.

Independent Variables

Environmental Allies and Median Voter Measures. We measure a sponsor’s environmental position and his or her deviation from the median voter with two measures capturing the bill sponsor’s environmental voting record. The first is a sponsor’s (lagged) LCV score (ranging from 0 to 100), which is given to all MCs annually by the League of Conservation
The Scorecard represents the consensus of experts from about 20 respected environmental and conservation organizations who select the key votes on which MCs should be scored. LCV scores votes on the most important issues of the year, including energy, global warming, public health, public lands and wildlife conservation, and spending for environmental programs. The Scorecard is the nationally accepted yardstick used to rate MCs on environmental, public health, and energy issues.

The second measure is a deviation score (ranging from 0 to 69), indicating the absolute value of how far a given bill sponsor’s LCV score diverges from the median LCV score of all other members who vote in that sponsor’s chamber.\(^8\)

**Environmental Protest.** For each year, we collected information on the annual counts of proenvironmental and antienvironmental protest events in each state. Data on environmental protest (both favorable and unfavorable) are from the Dynamics of Collective Action (DCA) project (Olzak, Soule, McCarthy, and McAdam 2011).\(^9\) This comprehensive event dataset contains information on the participants, claims, location, and timing of all protests in the United States that were recorded in the *New York Times* between the beginning of 1972 and the end of 1995.

A proenvironmental protest event was one whose claims were consistent with protecting the environment. Proenvironmental issues range broadly, including concerns about protecting against air, land/soil, noise pollution, loss of biodiversity, global climate change, nuclear power plants, promoting safe waste disposal and treatment of toxic chemicals. Proenvironmental protest may articulate broad goals such as recycling, wildlife management and conservation and preservation of biodiversity, or they may concern more specific issues such as population control, maintaining water and soil quality, or concerns about industry-specific influences, such as farming runoff, logging, deforestation, irradiated food (Brulle 2000; Shipan and Lowry 2001).

An antienvironmental protest event was one whose claims run counter to proenvironmental claims listed above. For example, antienvironmental claims include prologging, opposition to conservation policies, and claims that environmental movement demands hurt the local or national economy. Some antienvironmental protest events are directed at a specific environmentalist group, such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth.

Skeptics might question whether or not our measures of protest conflate media attention with measures of actual social movement activity (Andrews and Caren 2010; Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004). To address this question we used an extremely comprehensive online archive (“The Environmental Index”) of 2.4 million records of publications in a wide variety of subareas relevant to the study of the environment to code the annual counts of (a) newspaper mentions of all of our environmental protest search terms (and their combinations), (b) annual counts of books, monographs, conferences, and published articles using these same search terms and (c) a combined count of both of these categories annually. The count of periodicals published on the environment was correlated .95 (academic articles were correlated .85) with the time trend indicator. Unfortunately, these high correlations prevent us from including any of these important measures of media attention to the environment (although it is interesting that such a linear time trend exists).\(^10\)

In choosing a source of information on protest, we acknowledge that there are drawbacks to using a single newspaper source (Oliver and Maney 2000). Most importantly, this approach potentially introduces various sources of measurement error; however, we are not aware of any alternative, reliable, and continuous source of data on environmental protest covering this period (while online archives of many local or regional newspapers are increasingly available, they generally begin tracking events in the late 1980s, well after the start of our legislative histories). By focusing on a single source, we also minimize effects of local political bias that might affect local coverage of events.
Environmental Lobbyist Organizations. To obtain yearly information on local state organizations that operate as national-level lobby organizations in Washington DC, we began with a master list provided by the online Encyclopedia of Associations for 2006, selecting off organizations under the following categories: conservation, ecology, energy, environment, environmental education, environmental health, environmental law, natural resources, nuclear energy, pollution control, waste, water resources, wildlife, and wildlife conservation. For each organization, we coded the year it was founded (and disbanded, when it no longer appeared in the Encyclopedia), as well as the state(s) for which it lobbies (e.g., Conservation Council of North Carolina). When we found no information on a lobbyist organization’s state location, we consulted Brulle et al.’s (2007) encyclopedic dataset in order to locate state origins for these organizations.

Control Variables

Sponsor’s Positional Characteristics. Because few bills (some estimate between three and five percent) become law, a sponsor’s party affiliation with the dominant party should be relevant to its passage (Anderson et al. 2003; Cox and Terry 2008; Krutz 2005; Moore and Thomas 1991). Furthermore, given the possibility of different party majorities in the House and Senate, a sponsor’s party membership is chamber-specific. We account for majority party leverage with a dummy variable indicating whether or not a bill’s primary sponsor is a member of the political party in majority in his or her voting chamber (coded from Congressional Committees, Historical Standing Committees). Specialization within a policy area also matters, conveying a sense of expertise or special technical knowledge. As a measure of past specialization on environmental issues, we include the number of previous environmental bills a sponsor has introduced in our models.

Research on Congressional legislation also finds that committee leaders tend to sponsor and pass more legislation than rank and file members (Anderson et al. 2003; Cox and Terry 2008). Part of this productivity boost is guaranteed by the chair’s duty to reflect the intentions of the committee as a whole (Adler and Wilkerson 2005; Cox and Terry 2008). Because they can set the pace of the agenda, which determines which bills will be brought forward for consideration, we expect environmental committee chairs to have more success than ordinary MCs in shaping the outcomes of environmental bills they introduce (Moore and Thomas 1991; Woon 2008). We capture these ideas by including a dummy variable indicating whether or not a bill’s sponsor is chair of an environmentally relevant committee in the House (Energy and Commerce, Natural Resources) or in the Senate (Energy and Natural Resources, Environment and Public Works).

Citizen Ideology. A long tradition in the social sciences suggests that public preferences influence policy either indirectly through issue salience or directly through reelection pressure (Burstein et al. 2005). Ideally, we would have liked to have indicators of public opinion regarding specific bills, or even on general environmental topics and debates. Unfortunately, no comprehensive time series information on public opinion regarding environmental issues exists at the state level (very few identical questions have been asked about the environment in general over time, even at the national level—see Dunlap and Scarce 1991).

To compensate for the absence of reliable data on state-level public opinion on the environment, we turn to William Berry, Evan Ringquist, Richard Fording, and Russell Hanson’s (1998) proxy for a state’s citizens’ ideology. This is a composite measure of a state’s citizens’ ideological position along a conservative to liberal spectrum, where a higher value indicates broad support for liberal causes across a broad spectrum of issues. The components of the Berry et al. (1998: 330-31) index include (a) interest group ratings of the ideology of incumbents by district, (b) ideology of the challenger (or hypothetical challenger), estimated as the average ideology of incumbents in the same party in the state, and (c) election results to calculate the ideology of the district. In the final step, they aggregate these scores across districts to calculate an unweighted average of the ideology for the state. State-level
characteristics were then attached to each sponsor’s bill from that state (for a review see Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner 2010).

Additional Control Measures Examined. We also include a number of measures that were informed by a variety of studies of social movements and other influences on policy outcomes. For example, arguments from the grievance perspective suggest that the rate of environmental legislation increases as the number of environmental problems or crises increases (e.g., see Johnson and Frickel 2011). As such, we include a measure of the number of the EPA’s newly designated hazardous waste sites. To remain consistent with past research on the environmental movement (e.g., Agnone 2007; Johnson, Agnone, and McCarthy 2010; Olzak and Soule 2009), we include a measure for whether or not the president of the United States was a Democrat. Similarly, because population size presumably increases a state’s political clout, we control for population size (though the number of MCs elected to the House from small states partly compensates for this). To gauge the overall economic well-being in a state, we include a state’s annual unemployment rate, which may undermine support for costly environmental policies. To avoid conflating these measures with incremental changes in them over time, we add a time trend variable to our analyses. All concepts, measures, sources, and descriptive statistics are listed in table 1 (all covariates are lagged one year).

Methods of Analysis

The analysis examines the rate at which an introduced piece of legislation is passed ($\lambda$ in the equation below). All bills that were introduced are considered at risk of being enacted. Beginning in 1973, we calculated the duration (in days) from the time a bill was introduced until it had been enacted (or not enacted) at the last date that Congress was in session. All bills that were not enacted as of that date were coded as right censored. This method allows us to take into account two pieces of information simultaneously: whether or not a bill passed and how long a bill took to pass (or did not pass). In addition, event-history models are appropriate for longitudinal studies in which the outcome of interest is a relatively rare occurrence (Tuma and Hannan 1984).

We first investigated a number of parametric and nonparametric proportional hazard (PH) models, which specify the rate as a nonnegative function of the covariates. Exploration of the proportionality assumption found that these methods were appropriate. Because our hypotheses include processes that are expected to have effects at the state level and at the sponsor level, we explored using several multilevel estimation techniques (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). However, these multilevel techniques do not take information about the timing of a bill’s progression from introduction to passage (or not) into account and they cannot estimate the effects of duration dependence, as several parametric PH models do. We control for the fact that sponsors are nested within states by identifying each bill-sponsor’s home state and clustering on this measure (we also conducted analyses clustering on sponsor’s identification and obtained results identical to those shown here).

Based on the diagnostic explorations of the functional form of the relationship between duration time and analysis time, we found that the Weibull parametric model that assumes a time dependent process was most appropriate, given evidence of negative dependence in the rate at which bills were passed. This decision is supported by the fact that the scale parameter is positive and significant in all models. The shape of this ancillary parameter suggests that the chances of a bill becoming law are greatest just after a bill is introduced and they decline with the passage of time. All bills that do not pass are treated as right censored by the end of the Congressional session.

We also compared AIC and BIC statistics of other parametric estimation techniques, including the exponential, Gompertz, log-logistic, and piecewise constant exponential models. Although the pattern of results did not differ in terms of direction or significance across specifications, the AIC statistics were consistently lower for the Weibull model when compared
to the others. Inspection of the Kaplan-Meier estimates and plots of the Weibull model against other parametric forms showed that the Weibull model was a good approximation of the hazard rate plotted over the observed analysis time (in days). Formally, this model is

$$\lambda_j = e^{-x_j \beta \rho},$$

where $x$ is a vector of covariates, $\beta$ is a vector of regression coefficients and $\rho$ is an ancillary parameter estimating time dependence. If duration dependence is present, then the hypothesis is $\rho > 1$.

### Table 1. Concepts, Measures, and Sources of Covariates in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept and Variable Name</th>
<th>Source of Data</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Ally: Sponsor’s LCV Score</td>
<td>League of Conservation Voters</td>
<td>52.06</td>
<td>29.71</td>
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<td>26.25</td>
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<td>1.38</td>
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<td>Counter Movement: Strength: Number of Protests with Anti-Environmentalist Claims</td>
<td>Dynamics of Collective Action: <a href="http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/">http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/</a></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<td>Lobbyist Strength; N of Nat’l Environmental Lobby Orgs. Registered by State</td>
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<td>18.78</td>
<td>22.56</td>
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<td>Partisan Strength: Sponsor’s Party Has Majority in Chamber (0,1)</td>
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<td>Sponsor Power: Sponsor is Chair of Environment Committee in Chamber (0,1)</td>
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<td>1.10</td>
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<td>16.11</td>
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</table>
RESULTS

Table 2 presents results of the effects of a sponsor’s previous LCV score and his/her deviation from the median LCV score. In column 1 of table 2 we see that the measure of a sponsor’s previous environmental policy position (as measured by his or her lagged LCV score) is negative and significant, as expected by hypothesis 1A.18 We find no support for the “allies in power” perspective that bills sponsored by MCs with favorable environmental records will be successful. Indeed, the influence of a sponsor’s higher LCV significantly decreases the rate at

Table 2. Effects of Sponsor’s Environmental Score and Constituents’ Social Movement Activity on the Hazard Rate of Passage of Environmental Bills, 1973-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariates</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCV Score and Deviation Score:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor’s LCV Score</td>
<td>-.007***</td>
<td>-.007**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor’s Deviation from Median LCV</td>
<td>-.012***</td>
<td>-.013***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Activity:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Pro-environmental Protests</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Anti-Environmental Protests</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.221)</td>
<td>(.221)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Strength:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Lobbyist Organizations</td>
<td>.005**</td>
<td>.007**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor is Member of Majority Party</td>
<td>.805***</td>
<td>.728***</td>
<td>.735***</td>
<td>.816***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.107)</td>
<td>(.099)</td>
<td>(.102)</td>
<td>(.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor is Chair of Env. Committee</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td>.364</td>
<td>.352</td>
<td>.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.221)</td>
<td>(.233)</td>
<td>(.221)</td>
<td>(.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Prior Env. Bills Sponsored</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redundant Bill Introduced (0, 1)</td>
<td>-.004-01</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.002</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.094)</td>
<td>(.092)</td>
<td>(.091)</td>
<td>(.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic president (0, 1)</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.122</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.093)</td>
<td>(.098)</td>
<td>(.100)</td>
<td>(.093)</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Population Size in 100,000s</td>
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<td>-.194**</td>
<td>-.248***</td>
<td>-.256***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.056)</td>
<td>(.050)</td>
<td>(.050)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal Citizen Ideology</td>
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<td>-.009*</td>
<td>-.009***</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Hazardous Waste Sites</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
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<td>.062</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Trend</td>
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<td>.038***</td>
<td>.030***</td>
<td>.030***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(.413)</td>
<td>(.413)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo log likelihood</td>
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<td>-2848.5</td>
<td>-2847.4</td>
<td>-2828.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>N of Observations</td>
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<td>12238</td>
<td>12238</td>
<td>12238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Uncensored spells</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All covariates are lagged one year. p*<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
which an environmental bill is passed, as per our hypothesis. Specifically, the results in column 1 of table 2 indicate that as a sponsor’s LCV increases by one standard deviation from its mean of 52.06, the rate declines by 15.9 percent.

The picture becomes even more interesting when we examine the effect of deviation from the median LCV score (hypothesis 1B). In column 1, we see that this measure of the (absolute value) distance between a sponsor’s LCV score and that of the median member in his or her chamber, has a significant negative effect, net of the effect of a sponsor’s own pro-environmental LCV score. Though it may seem counterintuitive, it is important to note that the correlation of a sponsor’s (lagged) LCV score and the magnitude of deviation from the median LCV in a sponsor’s chamber is only .15.\(^1\) We find it striking that both friends and foes of the environmental movement are less efficacious in getting their bills enacted (see also Moore and Thomas 1991).

The coefficient for the measure of deviation indicates that a rating by the LCV that diverges (in either way) from the median LCV score in that sponsor’s chamber significantly decreases the rate of passage of a bill. And, this effect remains robust to the inclusion of our other measures in subsequent columns of table 2. This negative effect suggests that a sponsor whose most recent votes on environmental policies were more extreme is less likely to get their own legislation passed. Specifically, taking the scale parameter into account, the coefficient in column 1 for the sponsor’s deviation score (-.012) tells us that if the magnitude of a sponsor’s (absolute) deviation from the median LCV score increases (or decreases) from zero (implying an LCV score right at its median value) to its mean level of deviation across all MCs (26.25), the hazard rate of enactment declines by 26 percent. Similarly, the coefficient of -.013 in column 4 tells us an increase in a sponsor’s deviation score away from the median LCV score would decrease the rate of enactment by 28 percent, compared to the mean value across all MCs.

Consistent with the thrust of the median voter perspective and with hypothesis 1B, vehement environmental advocates or opponents are likely to have entrenched positions that may inhibit flexibility (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Extremist sponsors might also find their bills discounted by others holding less partisan views on environmental issues. Thus, the price of taking recent and relatively extreme (and public) environmental positions is evidently fairly high.

Column 2 presents the effect of pro-and antienvironmentalist protest in a sponsor’s state. While the coefficients are in the expected directions in both cases, neither measure of the magnitude of environmental movement protest is significant. Thus, we find no support for hypotheses 2A and 2B that there would be an effect of visible movement activity on either side of the environmental debate on the hazard rate of enactment of environmental legislation.

Column 3 focuses on the effect of lobbyist organizations. As predicted by hypothesis 3, the number of lobbyist organizations that advocate for their home state in Washington DC significantly improves the chance that an environmental bill from that state will be enacted (once that sponsor’s characteristics are included in the model). To our knowledge, this is the first evidence documenting a strong, significant, and positive link between a state’s lobbyist organizations and the success of bills sponsored by representatives from that state in Congress, net of a host of other bill characteristics (for analyses of specific lobbyist activities in Congress, see Baumgartner et al. 2009; McKay 2012).

Column 4 presents the full model including measures of LCV scores, deviation, protest, and lobbyist organizations. Looking across the various different specifications, we see remarkably stable estimates for our measures (and for the control variables). In the full model, we find robust support for hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 3, but we find no support for the claim that constituents’ protest activity influences the fate of environmental legislation (hypotheses 2A and 2B). Evidently, environmental mobilization by constituents is too far removed (both in time and in space) from the events in Washington to make much of a difference (Burstein 2014).
Turning to the effects of our control variables in columns 1-4, we see that our results are largely consistent with past research showing that legislative efficacy is also a function of positional power in Congress. As we expected, the variables measuring sponsor’s political power and influence have a positive influence on the rate of a bill’s passage: a sponsor’s membership in the dominant political party and previous sponsorship of environmental legislation are both relevant to legislative success. The dominant political party coefficient of .816 in column 4 of table 2 indicates that a sponsor who is a member of the majority political party in his or her chamber is over twice as likely (120 percent higher) to have their legislation enacted than other sponsors (exp (.816/1.037)*1 = 2.20).

Columns 1-4 in table 2 also show no significant effects of factors that might increase a state’s demand for proenvironmental legislation, as measured by evidence of environmental hazards or having a more liberal ideology. Unemployment has a positive (but insignificant) effect on a bill’s passage in all four columns of table 2. The time trend measure is positive and significant, suggesting that the hazard rate of enacting environmental legislation increased over this period, net of other factors. Finally, contrary to expectations, less populous states have more efficacious representatives in Congress, at least with respect to the passage of environmental legislation (and this result holds up across many different specifications).

Following Agnone (2007), Johnson et al. (2010), and Olzak and Soule (2009), we anticipated that Democratic presidents would encourage the rate of environmental legislation, but while the effect of Democratic presidential regimes is positive, it is not significant. The absence of an effect of Democratic presidential leadership may seem puzzling, but it is not totally unexpected. This finding, alongside that of the sponsor LCV score described above, calls into question the idea that the presence of elite allies of a social movement increases the success of a bill favorable to that movement.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

Our results present a complicated picture of the role of social movements and their elite allies in producing outcomes relevant to a specific movement. Contrary to the “allies in power” perspective, bill sponsors with recent proenvironmental voting records were significantly less successful at passing environmental legislation in the following year. Moreover, the absolute level of deviation of a sponsor’s LCV score from the median voter shows that both friends and foes are less efficacious in getting their bills passed, when compared to MCs evaluated as closer to the median LCV score.

We find it striking that bills are less likely to pass Congress when they are sponsored by MCs who have been judged as friendly to the environmental movement and when they are sponsored by MCs who have recently deviated the most from the median MC’s position on the environment (an interaction term was not significant). This finding suggests that extremists pay a penalty for taking partisanship stands within a specific issue area, especially when a reputable advocacy group, such as the LCV, publicizes these scores.

In an era of increasing legislative gridlock in Congress, it is worth speculating about the reasons why MCs holding extreme positions (either very positive or very negative) are apparently less effective in producing successful environmental legislation than are moderates. First, and most importantly, the lawmaking process in Congress involves a delicate balancing act between maintaining consistent political positions and compromising with other MCs who may not agree with those positions. To successfully negotiate with others, extremists must therefore travel a greater distance to the median voter, compared to those already in the middle of the distribution. In other words, the costs of compromise rise as the distance from the median environmentalist position increases.

Second, since 1990, positions on environmental legislation and public policy have become increasingly more partisan in Congress (Bosso 2005; McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014; Shipan and Lowry 2001). Democrats have moved toward endorsing more pro-
environmental policies and Republicans have increasingly opposed proenvironmental policies. This overlap between party membership and environmental ideology means that, in part, party loyalty has become intertwined with support for the environmental movement. This finding has two implications: First, attempts to monitor or increase party discipline on either side of the aisle ought to result in more gridlock and fewer pieces of legislation passed, at least within the environmental arena. If our results hold more generally, we have gained some insights into one obstacle to improving the environment by means of enacting policy at the federal level.

Certainly, a sponsor’s “positional power”—as indicated by the sponsor’s party membership in the dominant party’s majority—also positively affects a bill’s fate, as most legislative studies would expect. Prior activity within the same issue area is helpful, as we anticipated, suggesting that MCs gain leverage from specializing in a specific public policy arena.

Although we have analyzed a relatively large number of bills compared to earlier studies, we acknowledge that our study has several important limitations. First, there are trade-offs to using these data, which, despite broad national coverage, remain relatively limited to a specific time period. Thus, we suspect that polarization of attitudes and indeed legislative activity on the environment has increased even further since our observations ended. Nevertheless, the brief introductory remarks published at the beginning of each year’s League of Conservation Voter Scorecard indicate that partisan stands on environmental issues had become distinctly more polarized and increasingly more contentious by the early 1990s. So we are confident we have captured at least some of this partisan dynamic in our analysis.

Second, while we employed a number of strategies to obtain clear indications that a bill was favorable to the environment, some errors undoubtedly remain. Finally, we remind readers that there are unanticipated consequences of environmental legislation: laws are more accurately conceptualized as inputs that can be reinterpreted, countered, or even repealed. This observation underscores the advantages for using a longitudinal research design to examine the consequences of movement activity.

Several findings reported in our analysis echo the growing belief that Congress has become increasingly polarized, unproductive, and largely unresponsive to public demands for change. In particular, our findings support the claim that there seems to be a disjuncture between demands for environmental change from local constituents and the response by MCs, at least within the domain of environmental protest (Abrams and Fiorina 2012). These findings cast doubt on claims that peaceful protests and demonstrations by constituents positively influence the policy process. At least for the environmental movement, we find that an institutionalized network of lobbyist organizations influences the successful passage of legislation when compared to the amount of protest activity among constituents.

Our work suggests there are substantial theoretical payoffs to directing attention to constituent advocacy and sponsor’s characteristics (including ideological stands) in the same analysis. Most theories expect social movements to reap some benefits from having elite allies in Congress. However, it turns out that the environmental movement’s most visible allies and opponents in Congress hinder, rather than help, the passage of environmental legislation that they sponsor. In contrast to social movement theories, our findings suggest that it is not protest that increases legislators’ productivity. Instead, we find consistent evidence that organizational forms of social movement activity positively influence legislative productivity desired by movements, as resource mobilization theories have long maintained. Taken together, these results complement each other nicely by suggesting that there are substantial policy advantages for politicians whose environmental positions lie close to the center rather than at the extremes.
NOTES

1 To bring some conceptual clarity to our argument, we focus specifically on proenvironmental lobbyist groups and consider these organizations as such only if there is evidence that they lobby MCs from a specific state for the local protection and conservation of the environment in that state. We do not include national-level organizations whose scope of activities is admittedly important but cannot be directly linked to particular states. We consciously chose to keep our measure of lobbyist organizations distinct from other types of SMOs to avoid double-counting protest activities by interest groups and lobbying bodies. In addition, lobbyists target specific and very high stakes issues as they move through Congress, whereas SMOs and interest groups have more diverse goals (Olzak and Ryo 2007; Soule and King 2006).

2 We attempted to gather information on antienvironmental lobbyist organizations, but found that doing so requires making assumptions about entire industries (e.g., energy and natural resources). Furthermore, such data are only available for a very recent period (for an example, see the Follow the Money website: http://www.followthemoney.org/industry-influence, which begins in 1989). Nevertheless, Baumgartner et al. (2009: 174-6) provide an example in which environmental lobbyists successfully framed and then reframed the policy debate. In this example, the proenvironmental lobbyists helped pass a law banning further road building in national forests. These actions were later followed by many antienvironmental lobbyist attempts to curtail this law.

3 The 1973-1996 time frame of our study is limited both by the availability of relevant protest data from the Dynamics of Collective Action project and by the availability of legislation histories (http://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/). Specifically, detailed bill summaries were publicly available beginning only in 1973 and our protest data stops at the end of 1995.

4 To assess whether or not the number of days Congress is in session influenced the hazard rate, we included the number of days that both chambers were in session (see www.iomonikells.com_CC_sessionscongress.html). This measure had no significant effect and it did not influence the effect any of the measures reported in the table 2. As this website notes, “not in session” does not imply MCs are “not working.”

5 There are many studies on the causes and consequences of cosponsorship (Bratton and Rouse 2011; Koger 2003; Rocca and Sanchez 2008). However, because the rules governing cosponsorship of bills changed substantially over our observation period (it became substantially easier and the number of cosponsors has increased dramatically), we cannot reliably analyze the effect of cosponsorship on the rate of enactment for our observation period.

6 We compiled our dataset of proenvironmental bills in six steps: We first compared the text of all bills listed under a set of potentially relevant subtopic codes from the Adler and Willkerson dataset suggested to us by Bob Brulle and J. Craig Jenkins (personal communication) (using the Policy Agenda codes 700s, 800s, 1001, 1614, 1708, 1902, 1905, 2101, 2103, 2104). We then enumerated the number of bills in each of these categories that included one or more of these keywords: environment*, ecology* conservation, soil, water, air, forest*, landscape, pollut*, asbest*, lead, toxic, logging, wetland, waste, recycle* global warming, and greenhouse effect. In the second step, we deleted an entire subtopic code if less than 50 percent of its bills included one of these keywords. Compared to other subtopics, the energy subtopic codes for electricity, coal, and natural gas and oil subtopic areas had far fewer bills that could be considered proenvironment (the majority of bills in these subtopic categories supported industry concerns, as reported in the League of Conservation Voter archives). Third, we retained bills within the Energy area when subtopic labels mentioned one of our search terms and deleted those subtopics that did not contain proenvironmental concerns (e.g., we retained bills within the subtopic “Renewable Energy” but not from “Natural Gas and Oil”). Fourth, we analyzed the content of bill summaries for any ambiguous case by consulting the Thomas website (http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php). We also searched and content coded legal reviews of specific legislation, where available. Following Johnson, Agnone, and McCarthy (2010), we then consulted ProQuest Congressional Online archives of hearings on specific bills and then deleted ambiguous bills (see http://congressional.proquest.com/profiles/gis/search/advancedadvanced?accountid=140). In the final and sixth step, we read all bills listed in the LCV archives and deleted all bills by specific bill number and year that were designated “antienvironmental movement” legislation as designated from its introduction or through the amendment process.

7 For example, H.R. 39 (The Alaska National Lands Conservation Act), introduced by Morris K. Udall on January 15, 1979, was passed into law in 1980. Over the following seven years, multiple court cases have ruled on the various consequences of this legislation. Legal scholar Eric Toderer concludes that this bill ultimately achieved a positive “delicate balance” between conservation and development (for details, see Toderer 8 Pub. Land L. Rev 143 (1987). Available online: (http://scholarship.law.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=plrlr). To satisfy our curiosity further, we examined a number of “high impact” laws (identified by the League of Conservation Voters) but we found no clear pattern in the length of time they took to become enacted. Some took over a year, while some took only a few days to pass (the mean duration of bills that were enacted in our sample was 276 days).

8 There are, of course, other possible ways to measure deviation from the median voter. After discussing this issue with the original author (Krehbiel) of this theory, we decided that, for our purposes, this measure best captures the spirit of theoretical argument. We also calculated a sponsor’s deviation (in absolute values) from the median LCV score by aggregating scores across both chambers. This measure also had a negative and significant effect on the rate.

9 For details and data download, see http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal.

10 See http://www.ebscohost.com/academic/environment-index.

11 Once we had this master list, we then began with the 1961 bound volumes of the Encyclopedia of Associations and located lobbying organizations that existed, but then disbanded, prior to 2006.

12 We investigated two other sources of information on lobbyist organizations but ran into two problems: (1) information on nonprofit organizations from the IRS from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) website, http://nccs.urban.org, unfortunately only begins in 1989, and (2) Brulle et al.’s (2007) data began with
environmental organizations filing as nonprofits in the year 2003. Thus, any organization founded earlier but disbanded before 2003 would not be in the Brulle et al. 2007 dataset.


14 The power wielded by a committee chair might be either restrained or amplified by preferences of the majority party in that member’s chamber (Shipan and Lowry 2001). To explore this idea, we included a measure of the interaction between sponsor’s membership in the dominant party in that chamber and his/her leadership status, but it had no significant effect.

15 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that the EPA designation of Hazardous Waste sites could also be the result of vigorous pro-environmental efforts, in addition to (or instead of) being a straightforward measure of existing pollution. To confront this issue, we analyzed more direct measures of toxic air pollutants, from point, area, and mobile sources (for details on these distinctions, see http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/emissions.html): carbon monoxide, particulate matter emissions, nitrogen oxide emissions, and sulfur dioxide emissions. The results of this additional analysis were mixed: states with higher sulfur emissions from point sources (e.g., from chemical plants, oil refineries, hazardous waste incinerators) had significantly lower rates of enactment, as did states with higher emissions of particulate matter from point sources (perhaps due to successful lobbying campaigns by specific industries). However, states with higher estimates of particulate emissions from area and mobile sources (e.g., automobiles, neighborhood dry cleaners, gas stations) had a significantly higher rate of enactment, which supports a grievance argument. The ambiguity of these patterns may be due to missing data, which required interpolation of data points for the years 1982 and 1984 (or it could be due to other sources of measurement error). Most importantly, none of these measures had an impact on any of the other measures (and state-level indicators of carbon-monoxide and nitrogen oxide emissions had no independent effect). Finally, models omitting the hazardous waste measure did not show any differences from those reported in table 2.

16 Specifically, using the estat phtest command in STATA (12.1), we found that tests of nonproportionality for our key measures (sponsor’s LCV score, deviation score, pro- and anti-environmental protests, and lobbyist organizations) were not statistically significant, which means we cannot reject the null hypothesis (of proportionality). Further exploration of nonproportional hazard models that interact all covariates with time also did not affect the results (e.g., see table 3 in Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001: 984). Using several multilevel modeling techniques (xtmelogit and glm model procedures available in Stata 12.1), we obtain the same effects as those shown here concerning a sponsor’s LCV score and deviation from median LCV scores (in two-level models that included all sponsor characteristics and a random effects model of state-level sources of variation). However, when using the full set of covariates from column 4 in table 2, the mixed level models did not converge. While it is difficult to speculate why these problems occurred, it is worth noting that the specification of the dependent variable is different for mixed and PH models, so the results are not strictly comparable.

17 We also explored a specification of the “political mediation” model, by interacting a sponsor’s LCV score with proenvironmental protest, but the interaction term was correlated .93 with the protest count, and so its inclusion is not helpful. We also specified an interaction effect between a sponsor’s LCV score (or their deviation from the median LCV score in their chamber) and a dummy variable for whether or not a sponsor was a chair of an environmental committee in the House or Senate (see Woon 2008 for a similar specification). Neither of these interaction terms was significant.

18 As an additional robustness check, we compared the effects for bills sponsored in the House to those sponsored in the Senate. For the House, we find no differences in bills originating in the House with the results presented here. However, when analyzing bills originating in the Senate, there is no significant effect of the sponsor’s own LCV score (but the effect of the absolute deviation from the median member of Senate remains negative and significant). All other results remain the same regardless of chamber origin.

19 For example, some environmental movement activists criticized the Clinton regime for emphasizing business or economic interests over environmental movement concerns, especially in regard to NAFTA environmental provisions, air quality standards, and global emissions of greenhouse gasses (Huftbauer and Schott 2005). Readers might also be surprised that a dummy variable indicating 1 for the Reagan presidential years (1981-1988) showed significant positive effects on the rate of enactment of environmental legislation. Bosso (2005: 132) explains this fact by pointing out that the Republican Party controlled Congress during these years. However, the dummy variable indicating Reagan presidential years remained significant even when measures for House and Senate partisan majorities or dummy variables for “divided government” across the House, Senate, and presidency were included in the model.

20 We found LCV deviation scores of sponsors of environmental legislation have increased over time, which is consistent with the claim that Congress has indeed grown more polarized, at least on environmental issues (see also Bosso 2005). Although analysis of gridlock is out of the scope of our paper, we note that our findings are consistent with research showing that divided government and contested legislative bodies encourage inaction (but not always significantly—see Binder 2003).

REFERENCES


